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# **CONCEPTS OF BUDDHISM**



# CONCEPTS OF BUDDHISM

BY

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Some Kautilya Treaties of Ancient India etc*

WITH A FOREWORD BY

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## FOREWORD

The stimulus given to research by the late Sir Asutosh Mukherji when as Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University he set on foot an ambitious scheme of postgraduate studies, has brought into existence a body of Indian research workers who for some years past have been carrying on work first undertaken by European scholars of world-wide reputation. Prominent amongst those who have turned their attention to the early history and philosophy of the Hindus is Dr. Bimala Churn Law who has to his credit a number of volumes throwing light on the history and culture of the peoples who some four or five hundred years before the Christian era, inhabited that part of India of which Patna, the capital of the modern province of Bihar, is now the centre. It was here that Buddha lived and preached the doctrine of which Dr. Law gives us in the present volume a scholarly analysis based upon a careful study of the original texts.

In its main outlines the doctrine of Buddhism is now pretty widely known. But a full understanding of it must necessarily depend upon the interpretation placed upon the many technical terms and phrases in which it abounds, and it is this task of interpretation that Dr. Law sets out to discharge. It is not without significance that two of the shortest and most widely known words in the literature of Buddhism — *Dhamma* and *Nibbāna* — are precisely the words which have given rise to the greatest degree of controversy.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that it is to the concepts indicated by these two words that Dr. Law devotes the greatest amount of space. It may be that the reader of his chapter on *Nibbāna* will leave it with the conclusion that it was not the least element in Buddha's greatness that unlike the generality of mankind — even of Buddhist mankind — he remained unmoved by the logical conclusion of the human mind handicapped by the necessity under which it labours of functioning within the limits of time and space, that *Nibbāna* is the equivalent of extinction.

To follow the author in his examination of these two concepts would demand far more space than the writer of a foreword is entitled to let me therefore, by way of illustration of Dr Law's analyses take one of the less difficult of the concepts of Buddhism namely, that of the Four Noble Truths in which are proclaimed the existence the cause and the possibility of escape from suffering and finally the means of escape by way of the Noble Eightfold Path. The steps in the Noble Eightfold Path — right view right resolve right speech, etc. — are well known what is less well known is their precise significance and it is this that Dr Law proceeds to explain. His analysis of the concept constituting the first of the Four Noble Truths — *Dukkha* the affirmation that all existence is suffering — may be taken as an example of his method. *Dukkha* whether of the body or of the mind is conditioned by certain circumstances and in the absence of such circumstances it cannot occur. These circumstances may be described comprehensively as the day to day experience of conditions like and if the succession of such experiences or happenings cannot be changed it is at least open to the harassed mortal to enquire if there be any state of consciousness on attaining to which an individual is no longer affected by life's vicissitudes. The answer given by Buddhism affirms that there is attainable a state in which the consciousness of the individual is wholly unrelated to anything to which in life as we know it we can apply the term 'object'. The tried method of reaching that state is *Jhāna* or *Samādhi*. *Jhāna* or *Samādhi* is therefore according to Dr Law the central point in the Noble Eightfold Path the other seven practices constituting steps leading up to it. But neither *Jhāna* nor *Samādhi* is the simple concept which the above account might lead one to suppose and Dr Law devotes a chapter based on a wide selection of texts from the Buddhist scriptures and commentaries to a careful analysis of these essentially important terms. Here we pass into the higher realm of abstract thought and the reader must follow carefully in the footsteps of the author himself.

I am tempted to make one further reference to the subject matter of Dr Law's volume namely to his chapter on *Puggala* in which the case for and against the existence of an individual as a permanent entity is discussed. It will be remembered how in the *Ududapāṭha* or 'Questions of King Milinda' the King is driven

by the inexorable logic of the Sage Nāgaseṇa into admitting that there can be no such thing as an individual soul. How then, it will naturally be asked, can there be rebirth, the chief of the evils which it is the object of the Buddhist to escape, since to speak of re-incarnation when there is no soul to take on flesh, or of transmigrating when there is no entity to migrate, is merely to indulge in a contradiction in terms? Nāgaseṇa, the Sage, had his answer. Dr Law has his. Indeed, with happy condensation he crystallises the Buddhist view on this vexed question in a single sentence —

With the Buddhist rebirth is to be conceived as *Asamskṛtāntarā* or the continuity of an impulse.

The many other concepts of Buddhism including that of the Wheel of Causation with the twelve *nidānas* as its motive force, and the doctrine of *Kamma*, the Pali spelling and the Buddhist version of the Sanskrit doctrine of *Karma*, which constitutes the warp upon which the threads of the whole variegated philosophy of Hinduism is woven, will be found similarly analysed in the pages which follow. But I have said enough, perhaps, to make it clear that scholar and layman alike will find good value in the lucid exposition of these and other concepts of Buddhism which Dr Law gives us.

ZETLAND

26.8.1939



## PREFACE

In this little treatise an attempt has been made to deal with some of the important concepts of Buddhism *Sarana* (Profession of Faith) *Pāragutā* (Perfection) *Jāti* (Caste) *Āryasacca* (Four Noble Truths), *Ārya aṭṭhaṅga Magga* (Noble Eightfold Path), *Jhāna* (Meditation), *Puggala* (Individuality and Personality) *Paṭicca-samuppāda* (Dependent Origination) *Kamma* (Volition) *Dhamma* and *Nibbāna*. I must confess that it has not been an easy task to handle the subject, as the main concepts of Buddhism still require a very careful consideration before saying anything definitely about them. I have, however, spared no pains to throw some new light on the subject from the texts that have not been accorded the treatment they deserve.

I must acknowledge my gratitude to the Most Honourable The Marquess of Zetland, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for India who has very kindly contributed a foreword to this treatise in spite of the heavy burden of his duties. I remain ever grateful to him for the interest he takes in my researches.

The Kern Institute of Holland has done me a great honour by accepting this treatise as their monograph for which I am greatly thankful to the authorities of the Institute and especially to my esteemed friend Professor J. Ph. Vogel, C.I.E., Ph.D.

BIMALA CHLEY LAW

43 Kailas Doss Street  
Calcutta the 9th September  
1930





## CHAPTER I

### SARANA

(Profession of Faith)

In popular usage the word *sarana* means a shelter a place where a man driven by fear, seeks shelter or protection. The Buddhist texts mention mountains and forests, gardens and trees as places of shelter which are not considered by the Buddhists to be the real places of shelter.<sup>1</sup> With the Buddhists the term *Sarana* or Refuge are the Triad the Buddha the Doctrine and the Order. Each of these Refuges is a supreme object of devotion and worship. The Buddha is said to have established the converts in three *Saranas*. The usual formula by which a Buddhist takes refuge in the Triad is as follows:

•  
*Buddham saranam gacchāmi*  
*Dhammam saranam gacchāmi,*  
*Sangham saranam gacchāmi*

This formula is recited on all solemn occasions and is thrice repeated.<sup>2</sup>

According to Buddhaghosa and other Pāli commentators *Saranāgamaṇa* is not a mere formal recital of one's faith in the Triad but an expression of self devotion to an object and communion.<sup>3</sup> *Saranāgamaṇa* serves to establish a relation between the worshipper and the worshipped. If a person taking refuge in the Triad is ordained as a member of the Holy Order he is called a *Bhikkhu* and if such a person sticks to household life he is called an *Upāsaka* or layman. *Upasana* or an act of worship constitutes the mark of an

<sup>1</sup> *Dhammapadam* 156

*Buddham sa saranam samiti paṭhatāmi eva ña ca āramāsi ti haṃsaṃ samasāsi bhāvaṃ gacchāmi*

<sup>2</sup> *Imagga Vithaya*, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Samangala Sūtra* I p. 31; *Parivāṇa* II p. 16; *Sappasāda* 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

*Upasaka* <sup>1</sup> *Saranāgama* is of two kinds *loka* (common) and *lokutara* (uncommon) *Loka* *sarasa* contemplates the tangible attributes of the Triad while the *lokutara* *sarasa* aims at *nirvāṇa* as the supreme object of attainment <sup>2</sup> Buddhaghosa speaks of the following four modes of *saranāgama*

- (1) Self-dedication (*atta sarana-sāmanā*)
- (2) Having the mind bent upon the object (*lopparayanataya*)
- (3) Entering into relation as a disciple (*sisrabhāvāpaga nānena*)
- (4) Adoration (*paṇṇāpānā*)

The first mode is defined as conscious dedication of oneself to the Triad. The second mode consists in entertaining the Triad as the final end or ideal. The third mode consists in conscious acceptance of the position of a disciple or follower in relation to the Triad. The fourth mode consists in the act of saluting, honouring and glorifying the Triad. In following the fourth mode the devotee must believe that the object of worship is the highest of its kind (*aggaḍakkhinīya*) <sup>3</sup>

*Buddha*, the first member of the Triad, means the Enlightened or Awakened One. According to the Upannads *Buddha* in the sense of the Awakened occurs as a predicate of 'soul'. *Suprabuddha* is the epithet of the *āhats* <sup>4</sup>. *Sammāsambuddha* and *Pariccha-Buddha* are self-made personalities. They are called self-made because they attain *mukti* by their own efforts without the aid of any teacher. A *Sāṅghika Buddha* is one who has become a saint by following the teachings of a Master. A *Buddha* is also called a *Bhagava*. According to the *Mahāvuddha* <sup>5</sup> and the *Paramatthapajotika* <sup>6</sup>, the epithet *Bhagava* was bestowed on the Buddha neither by his parents nor by his other relations. It was acquired by him on his attainment of omniscience. *Bhagava* is equal to *bhagavanta* one endowed with *bhaga*, which in its generally accepted sense means the sixfold supreme possession of *usarīya*, *dhamma*, *śara*, *siri*, *kāma* and *paritama*. *Issariya* com-

<sup>1</sup> *Suman ala* *śara* I p. 34 *Upasaka* *upasaka*

<sup>2</sup> *Ib idem* I p. 31

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem* I pp. 37-38

<sup>4</sup> *Upannāpāda* *śara* 100-101

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<sup>5</sup> I pp. 107-108

prehends the idea of such qualities as *ananta* and the rest. *Dhamma* means the transcendental virtues. *Yasa* implies a pure lane of universal recognition. *Sari* connotes an all-round accomplishment. *Kāma* signifies all objects of desire. *Pavattana* means the supreme effort to gain sovereignty over all. *Bhagavābhaji* or *bhattavā* one who has recourse to i.e. has the experience of all things. *Bhagavā* = *bhāgi* means the participator of all acquisitions. *Bhagavā* = *abhat-tavā* means one who explains things by apportionment or method of an analytical distinction. *Bhagavā* = *bhaggakari*, i.e. the destroyer of all evils. *Bhagavā* = *garv* the master who is superior to all. *Bhagavā* = *bhagvā*, the fortunate or blessed one. *Bhagavā* = *bhavanatya* i.e., one who has gone beyond individual existence. *Bhagavā* = *sukhasiddha*, i.e., one who has fully "developed himself".

The following attributes are ascribed to Buddha in the tract called *Dhammaddāsa* or 'Mirror of Faith'. That he is the Blessed One endowed with faculties and noble conduct well-gone perfect in his knowledge of the world, unsurpassed guide to persons coming in for training, a teacher to gods and men, the Enlightened One, the Master.<sup>1</sup>

A Buddha is also called a Tathāgata for the following reasons: (1) he has come in the same way, (2) he has gone in the same way, (3) he is endowed with the sign of *tathā*, (4) he is supremely enlightened in *tathadhamma*, (5) he has seen *tathā*, (6) he preaches *tathā*, (7) he does *tathā* truthfully, and (8) he overcomes all.<sup>2</sup>

*Dhamma*, the second of the Triad, signifies a doctrine which is well-expounded, which bears fruit in this very life, which is not conditioned by time, which has come and see for its motto, which leads to the destination or desired end and which is to be experienced by the wise individually.<sup>3</sup> The Dhamma embodying all the tenets of the Master was to take the place of the Master in his absence. After the demise of the Buddha, one of his disciples declared *Mayaṃ dhammapatisarāṇa* the Doctrine is indeed our

<sup>1</sup> Haras & Sinha, *Baskin Inscriptions*, p. 41, l. 10-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Iti pi so Bhagavā anāram sambuddho vijjāsarāṇa sampanno sagāro lokānaṃ amāraṇa parināmanā idarāḥ satthā dāsa mānuṣānaṃ*. Buddha *Bhagavā* in *Dugha* II, p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> B. C. Law, *A History of Pāli Literature* II, pp. 412 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Dugha* II, p. 93.

Refuge now <sup>1</sup> For this and other aspects of *Dhamma* vide Chap on Dhamma

*Sangha*, the third of the Triad, includes *Bhikkhū sangha* and *Bhikkhunī-sangha*. It really means *Sāvaka sangha* or a fraternity of disciples. *Sangha* literally means *samūha* or group. In early Pāli literature some of the famous teachers of India are mentioned as *saṅghī* (founder of an order) *gaṇī* (having a following) and *gaṇacariya* (teacher of a group). At the time of the rise of Buddhism, the Vṛjś Mallas, and other Kṣatriya tribes were known as *Gaṇarājās* or republican chiefs. Even the Śākyaś had their *gaṇa* form of administration. A *sangha* is a corporate body which is characterised by the uniformity of creed and conduct (*Dutthi-sīlasamghātena samghāto ti sangha*) <sup>2</sup> *Samaggatā* or internal cohesion constitutes the real life of a *Sangha* as such. The unity of action and commonness of goal characterise its external life. Thus the *sangha* stands essentially as a symbol of unity. The Buddha compares the *sangha* to an ocean into which all individual rivers ultimately fall assuming the common name of the ocean. According to the Buddha's Mirror of Faith, *Sangha par excellence* is composed of all Arryan disciples who fill eight exalted positions.

<sup>1</sup> *Majjhima* III p. 9

<sup>2</sup> *Samangala* sūtra I p. 230 *Paramatthapada* I p. 20

## CHAPTER II

## PĂRĂNITĂ

(Perfektion)

*Pāramī*<sup>1</sup> is the same term as *Pāramitā* and both occur side by side in Dhammapāla's commentary on the *Carivapadāka*<sup>2</sup>. So far as later Buddhist literature goes, the bulk of Pāli works shows preclusion for *paramī* and that of Sanskrit works for *pāramitā*. In the Pāli canonical texts, however, *paramī* is the only form met with. In the *Niddhikanda-sutta*<sup>3</sup> we have *saraka-pāramī* the perfection of discipleship which is no other than the fruition stage of arhatship, the ripeness of samīhip which is the ideal before a Buddhist learner or aspirant. In the *Buddhavaṇṇa* on the other hand, the term *pāramī* is employed as a synonym of *Buddhahara dhammā*, the virtues or qualities which tend towards making a Buddha, i.e. maturing the life of a Bodhisattva for the attainment of Buddhahood in his last birth. Precisely in this sense Dhammapāla uses the term *Buddhahara dhammā* and quotes a passage of canonical authority with bearing on the point. The passage cannot be traced in the Pāli Text Society's edition of the *Tiṇṇakā*. Even if its antiquity be doubted on this ground (which is not very reasonable) there is the text of the *Buddhavaṇṇa* to show that at least as far back as the 2nd century B.C. *paramī* was treated as another term for *Buddhahara* or *Buddhahara dhammā*. It goes also to show that already in that time the *Pāramīs* were counted as ten in Theravāda Buddhism<sup>4</sup>, while the prose passage quoted by Dhammapāla clearly speaks of *dasā Buddhalāraha dhammā*.

<sup>1</sup> *Present or proposed means provided in a company or high school*

<sup>2</sup> *Canāp tu'wā'atā' t'akha' u el p 5 / t'adhaqandam : t'hān*  
*Buddha' d'at nīham a' t'irā' : t'hān' t' t' t'hān'*

\* This is clearly implied in *comment*, *sent* as the 5th phrase (the *comment* *sent* *phrases*) and closing the enumeration with *s/ending* occurring after *sent*2.

The quotations from the *Carivāpīṭaka*, the *Jāṭaka-nidāna katha* and the *Carivāpīṭaka* commentary presuppose a Canonical text compared with which the P.T.S. edition appears to be incomplete. These quotations fully attest that ten were the *Pāramīs* recognized in *Theravāda* Buddhism when the *Carivāpīṭaka* was compiled and taken into the corpus of the Pāli Canon along with and as an adjunct to the *Buddhavaṃsa*. Thus any surmise or conclusion drawn on the basis of the incomplete text of the *Carivāpīṭaka* regarding the number of *Pāramīs* is apt to be misleading.

These considerations may warrant the statement that when the conception of *Pāramitā* developed in Buddhism, the *Theravāda* school counted the *Pāramīs* as ten while in the Sanskrit works belonging mostly to the *Sarvāstivāda* school, the *Pāramīs* are counted as six.

The ten *Pāramīs* as enumerated in *Theravāda* are *dāna* (alms-giving), *sīla* (morality), *ackkhaṃsa* (renunciation), *paññā* (wisdom), *vīrya* (energy), *khamā* (forbearance), *sacca* (truth), *adhiṭṭhāna* (re-solution), *mettā* (friendliness) and *upekkhā* (indifference). Each of them is practised in three degrees of intensity. And the six *Pāramitās* as recognized in Buddhist Sanskrit tradition are *dāna*, *sīla*, *kṣānti*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā*. In order to get ten *paramitas*, the following four are to be added viz. *upāya*, *pranidhāna*, *bala* and *jñāna*. A Bodhisattva who has conceived an aspiration to become a Buddha advances in birth after birth to higher and higher sanctity in the practice of the ten perfections until at last he is born as the Buddha preaching the Law and passing away into the everlasting stillness of *Nirvāṇa* as we find in the *Jāṭakas*. An exactly accomplished Buddha should acquire all these *paramitās*. Each of these *paramitās* may be sub-divided into (1) the ordinary, (2) the superior and (3) the unlimited perfection of the virtue. Childers is right in agreement with Chough in saying that *dānapāramitā* expresses the duty in general terms and signifies acts of charity or making offerings without any reference to their nature or value (*vide* Childers' Dict., p. 335). A Bodhisattva after having exercised the ten *paramitās* in all the three degrees of their intensity in anterior births was destined to become an omniscient Buddha. Thus we see that the attainment of Buddhahood is the consequence of the vast accumulation of merit in course of the exercise of the

*pāramitā*s in previous births. In order to attain Bodhi or enlightenment a Bodhisattva had to fulfil the ten *pāramitā*s. He had to undergo several births to fulfil each *pāramitā*. In the *Jātakamudrā-kāśā* we read that these ten *pāramitā*s are the *Buddhakaraka-dhammā* i.e., the precepts which make one Buddha. The great Śākya prince Siddhārtha before attaining Bodhi found these *pāramitā*s out to be the only means of attaining Buddhahood. All the previous Buddhas also had to fulfil them in order to attain Buddhahood. Siddhārtha performed these *pāramitā*s. Bodhisattva Samedha fulfilled *dāna pāramitā* by giving in charity all the worldly things, and his own life; he fulfilled *sīla pāramitā* by observing precepts and without taking the least care for his own life, he fulfilled *sakkāramma pāramitā* by renouncing household life like a prisoner always anxious to be released from the prison; he fulfilled *pañña pāramitā* by learning whatever he could learn from anybody; he fulfilled *arava pāramitā* by behaving like a lion, the king of beasts; he fulfilled *khamā pāramitā* by forgiving all the wickedness of his most patiently like the earth; he fulfilled *vera pāramitā* by not telling lies for fear of punishment or for temptation or even for the falling of thunder on his head; he fulfilled *adhiṭṭhāna pāramitā* by steadfastly adhering to his endeavour to become a Buddha like a mountain unmoved by storm coming from all directions; he fulfilled *maitrī pāramitā* by cherishing love and friendliness towards his friends and foes alike like water cooling both the virtuous and the sinner; he fulfilled *upekkhā pāramitā* by being indifferent to happiness and suffering like the earth (cf. *Jātakamudrā-kāśā* Vol. I).

A Buddha is called *Dhammakaṇṭha* because he is the embodiment of these ten *pāramitā*s. Dr. Barnett points out that *dāna pāramitā* is not an actual deliverance of the world from poverty but an intention for such deliverance; it is a grace of the spirit. Thus purity of the will is the greatest of all virtues and the foundation of all. He further points out that *sīla pāramitā* consists essentially in the will to hurt no living creature (vide the Path of Light, Wisdom of the East Series, p. 98).

As for examples of *dāna pāramitā* we may refer to the following in the *Carvāṅgīya* — *dharmacariyam* (*Uṇṭi Jātaka Jātaka* Vol. IV), *Saṅkhecarīyam* (*Saṅkhepala Jātaka Jātaka* Vol. V), *Kuru dhammacariyam* (*Kurudhammī Jātaka Jātaka* Vol. II) *Mahānāga-*



*sanacarivam* (*Mahasudassana Jataka, Jataka, Vol I*), *Mahāgovindacarivam* (*Mahāgovinda Suttanta, Dīgha Nikāya Vol II*) *Nim-rājacarivam* (*Nimi Jātaka, Jataka, Vol VI*) *Candakumaracarivam* (*Khandakūla Jātaka Jataka, Vol VI*), *Sinujācarivam* (*Sini Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol IV*) *Vessantaracarivam* (*Vessantara Jataka Jataka Vol VI*), and *Sasapunditacarivam* (*Sassa Jataka, Jātaka Vol III*) The following are the instances of *śīla pāramitā* mentioned in the *Carivāṇṇatāka* —

*Sīlamanugācarivam* (*Sīlamanugga Jataka Jataka, Vol I*) *Bhāri-dattacarivam* (*Bhāridatta Jataka, Jātaka Vol II*) *Campivvanāga-carivam* (*Campervva Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Cūjabodhicarivam* (*Cullabodhi Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Mahimsajācarivam* (*Mahisa Jataka Jataka Vol II*) *Rurujācarivam* (*Ruru Jātaka Jataka, Vol IV*) *Mālaṇṇacarivam* (*Mālugga Jātaka Jataka Vol IV*) *Dhammādhammadāraputtacarivam* (*Dhamma Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Jaraddhacarivam* (*Jaruddisa Jātaka Jataka Vol V*), and *Sanhāpālacarivam* (*Sanhāpala Jataka Jātaka Vol V*)

The examples of *Nekkhamma pāramitā* can be found in the *Yudhāñṇajācarivam* (*Yudhāñṇa Jataka Jātaka, Vol IV*) *Somanassacarivam* (*Sumanassa Jataka Jataka Vol IV*) *Avogharacarivam* (*Avoghara Jataka Jataka Vol IV*) *Bhāssacarivam* (*Bhāsa Jātaka, Jataka Vol IV*) *Sonapanditacarivam* (*Somananda Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol V*) In the *Carivāṇṇatāka* only one instance of *adhiṭṭhāna pāramitā* is traceable in the *Tamavācarivam* which corresponds to the *Tamisa Jātaka (Jataka VI)* which is also known as the *Mūgapakkha Jataka* found in the *Jātaka Vol II* As for examples of *sacca pāramitā* we may cite the following —

*Kapujācarivam* (*Kapi Jataka Jātaka Vol II*) *Saccanāyaka-panditacarivam* (*Saccanāya Jātaka Jātaka Vol I*) *Vattapāṇṇā-carivam* (*Vattia Jataka Jataka Vol I*) *Macchajācarivam* (*Maccha Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol I*) *Kandhāṭṭhāpāvanacarivam* (*Kandhāṭṭhāpāvana Jātaka Jataka Vol IV*) and *Mahānāmasacarivam* (*Mahānāmasa Jātaka, Jātaka Vol V*) *Mahānāmasacarivam* of the *Carivāṇṇatāka* which corresponds to the *Lomaṇassa Jataka* in *Jataka Vol I*, is the only instance of *Upekkhā pāramitā* *Sumanasamacarivam* (*Sāma Jataka Jātaka Vol VI*) and *Ekavajācarivam* (*Ekavaja Jātaka Jātaka Vol III*) are the instances of *Metta pāramitā* as found in the *Carivāṇṇatāka* The *Carivāṇṇatāka* is the only work of the Pāli

Canon in which a brief and systematic account of Buddhist *pāramitā* is given although references are found scattered here and there in the *Pali Nikāyas*.

The Mahāvāna Buddhist texts are replete with information regarding the fulfilment of *pāramitā* by the Bodhisattva. In the *Sraddhāpāśaṅkita*, Asvaghosa points out that the Bodhisattvas know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of spotless charity, and they being free from covetousness, practise *dāna pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* being free from the influence of five sensual pleasures and being free from immorality is the perfection of stainless morality and they being far above all these vices, practise *śīla pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of stainless patience, and they being free from malice practise *kṣanti pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of pure energy, they being free from indulgence, practise *vīrya pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* having nothing to do with disturbance and confusion is the perfection of pure tranquillisation they practise *dhyāna pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of pure wisdom they being free from darkness of ignorance practise *prajñā pāramitā* (cf. The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāvāna by Suzuki, pp. 122—123 vide also outlines of Mahāvāna Buddhism by Suzuki p. 60).

Thus, we see that the *parasutas* are the excellences of a Bodhisattva who never gets tired of practicing the ten virtues of perfection. A Bodhisattva in order to obtain Bodhi or enlightenment has to fulfil ten *pāramitā* (*parasutā*). The *Jātakamālā*<sup>1</sup>, the *Mahāvastu*<sup>2</sup> and the *Avadānaśatpithā*<sup>3</sup> contain instances of *pāramitā*. The idea of *parasuta* is similar according to Northern and Southern Schools of Buddhism with slight variations as noticed above.

We may agree with Dr Barua in thinking that the Piramitā doctrine had its root in the age-old Indian conception of faith (*saddhā*) particularly as developed in a *Sūtra* of the *Mahāyāna*.

<sup>1</sup> It contains 29, both strong and weak, of which have the same titles as those of the *Če. slobožda* table.

o.g. T-Zona Fläche und Maßstab sind angegeben

<sup>b</sup> e.g. *Silurus asotus*, *Silurus biwaensis*, *Silurus asotus*.

*Niāya* and that as it is its main importance lies in its bearing on the problem of evolution of personality, whether of the *Buddha* type, or of the *Sāvaka* or of the *Paścakabuddha*.<sup>1</sup> The Pāli book entitled *Apadāna* contains copious illustrations of how the *Sāvaka-pārami* was attained by a large number of men and women as the ripe result of their age-long efforts. In heightening the importance of the moral excellence of Buddhist personalities the doctrine had necessarily to lay stress on the prolonged character of strivings, and in doing so it destroyed the belief in the immediate prospects held out by Gotama and transferred the possibility of final fruition to an indefinitely long date.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> B. M. Barnes, *Faith in Buddhism* (Ivan's *Buddhist Studies*, pp. 329 ff.) and *Mahāyāna in the Mahāyāna* (*Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*).

<sup>2</sup> Barnes, *Mahāyāna in the Mahāyāna* (*Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*).

## CHAPTER III

### JĀTI

(Caste)

*Jāti* is the generally accepted Indian term to denote caste. *Varṇa* is another term to denote the same. In Pali we meet with the term *jātibhāṅga* or *jātibhāṇḍa* used in the sense of caste distinction. But the term *jāti-sāda* is used to signify the tradition built up by a family or a race or a school. The problem of caste was approached by the Buddhists from three different points of view — (1) biological (2) occupational and (3) cultural. (1) As a biological term *jāti* conveys the same meaning as *sādhva* or genus. The main criterion of genera is that they are mutually exclusive in the sense that sexual union for the purpose of procreation is not possible between them. Each genus consists of a number of species bearing some common characteristics, e.g. the two main divisions of the genus plant are represented by grass (*tīsa*) and trees (*vaḷḷha*). The difference between grasses and trees lies in the fact that the former are pathless without and are pithy without (*satapheggāna bahuvārāna*, *Sutta Nipata* Commy II p. 464) and the latter are just the opposite (*bahupheggā antorā* &c). The palm trees, coconut trees and the rest judged by the above characteristics come under the class grass. The insects, the flies, the ants form three different genera while the hares, the cat, and the rest form a class by themselves. The genus bird too may be thus shown to consist of various species. The similarity of bodily forms, habit of life and the like is a common characteristic of the species belonging to the same genus. If this be applied as a test of difference of genera among men, the Buddhists argue that human beings cannot be taken to represent any more than one species as between a brahmin and a member of any other caste there is absolutely no difference to be noticed in respect of bodily forms (*Sutta Nipata* verses 608—611) the habit of life and the rest. Further sexual union for the purpose of procreation is possible between any two human beings if they are male and female. The

upshot of the biological argument employed by the Buddhists is that the Brahmins the Kāśtrīyas, the Vaiśyas and the Śūdras do not represent *jāti* in the sense of species. They all belong to one and the same species. Thus according to the Buddhists, it cannot be maintained that a brahmin is a brahmin by birth. It is claimed that if both father and mother be persons of high social status, and both of them be persons of high moral character, the progeny born of them will be of a higher type of human beings. The Buddhists hold that the accident of birth cannot invariably determine the quality or potentiality of the progeny. A brahmin is a brahmin by qualities and not by accident of birth. (*Evam sante na jātiyā brāhmaṇo gacchati paṇa brāhmaṇo hoti Sutta N. Commentary, II 464—466*)

(2) Failing to establish caste distinction (*Jātibheda*) on a biological ground the Buddhists proceed to discuss whether and how far the distinction can be justified on occupational ground.

With them the distinction mainly rests on a difference in occupations of life. He who among men lives by cultivation is a cultivator. he who lives by handicraft is an artisan. he who lives by trade is a trader. he who lives by earning wages is a labourer. he who lives by theft is a thief. he who lives by waging war is a warrior. he who lives by acting as a *parakkita* is a priest and he who lives by governing a kingdom is a king. (*Sutta Nipata* verses 612—619)<sup>1</sup> Thus the position taken up by the Buddhists may be reduced to

<sup>1</sup> Yo hi loka manussesu uttakkham upapatti  
 evam Vasettha janāhi kusalo so na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu pytho uppenna jvati  
 evam Vasettha janāhi appiko so na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu vāḍḍhāna upapatti  
 evam Vasettha janāhi vāṇijo so na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu purappavasa jvati  
 evam Vasettha janāhi pavaso so na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu adinnam upapatti  
 evam Vasettha janāhi adino so na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu sabbatham upapatti  
 evam Vasettha janāhi sabbhāso na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu porakkhena jvati  
 evam Vasettha janāhi vāpako so na brāhmaṇo  
 Yo hi loka manussesu gāmaṃ rattachi ca bhūḍijati  
 evam Vasettha janāhi rājo so na brāhmaṇo

thus that the social status of a person is determined and determinable by means of occupation or livelihood (*Kammama*)

(3) *Jāti* as a cultural term is entertained by the Buddhists as a mainstay of man's virtue. *Jati* as an arrogant feeling which impels a man to look down upon other fellow beings is severely criticised but *jāti* as a moral or cultural tradition is highly valued. Each class of men by following a course of good conduct builds up a tradition for itself which has a high value in life as an incentive to betterment of the race and as a check to moral degradation. The tradition awakens in men self-consciousness which is essential to moral progress. The defiance of the cultural tradition thus built up leads to man's fall (*Jātiṇaṃ suvaṇṇatāṇi kammaṇaṃ sasaṃ upaggaṇaṃ — Sutta Nipata* verse 315)

With the Buddhists *Jati* was also a term to denote the moral disposition of a person. The Ājñakos divided human beings into six main types according to six such dispositions, each disposition being expressed in terms of a colour. *Kassabhijāti* (of a black disposition) *Loṇṇabhijāti* (of a red disposition) *Kaḍḍabhijāti*<sup>1</sup> (of a yellow disposition) and the like. The *Uḥabbhāva* substitutes *varṇa* for *abhiyati* the Pali *saṭṭhāyāsi* being the same expression as the Sanskrit *saṭṭhamaṇa*. The word *jāti* is used in Pali in the sense of *vaśīsa* *ukūḥajāsi* signifying a person of a boisterous nature. In the Edicts of Asoka the word *jati* has been used precisely in the sense of moral trait or disposition. These traits be not mine — is to be washed for (*ete jātā no āharaṃ mamaṃ*). — Separate Rock Edict no. I. Envy, quick loss of temper, cruelty, impatience, want of application, laziness and lethargy are mentioned as specific examples of such *jāti*s. Going by this text the abiding moral trait or disposition is the real determining factor of racial or personal type.

With the Brahmanists, the caste system is of a divine origin. It developed as though from the very beginning of creation out of the created form of *Nārāyaṇa* himself. According to the Buddhist *Asāṭṭa sūtaṃ* the entire social order including the stūti and the

<sup>1</sup> *Anguttara Nikāya* III p. 394

caste divisions developed gradually among men according to social needs. The *sūtra* repudiates the divine origin of both the state and social order. According to this Buddhist *sūtra* the caste distinctions had originated in differences in occupations or means of livelihood. In other words, it is the class which afterwards hardened into caste. All the arguments of the Buddhists against the Brahmanic theory of caste which he scattered in different Pāli *sūtras* have been summed up in the concluding chapter of the *Dhāvādaṇa* (Chap. 37). The *Dhāvādaṇa* opines: Just as thoughtless children while playing about on a high road heap up dust and sand in different shapes and christened them saying: this is milk, this is curd, this is meat and this is ghee—just so it and the four *Vāśas* as expounded by the Brahmins.<sup>1</sup>

The arguments in the *Paṇḍita sūtra* are re-stated more effectually in the *Dhāvādaṇa*. The biological classification of living beings according to genera and species (*janu* and *jāti*) may be made and maintained on the ground of similarity or difference in bodily forms, habit and other characteristics, but the application of biological test cannot be established that human beings belong to species more than one. As a matter of fact there is one species among men—all of them possessing common characteristics (*ekāṇa sūtu lokaṃ samasāmaṇāna prithagudha Dhāvādaṇa p. 625*). The Brahmanas, the Kētriyas, the Vaiśyas and the Sūdras are all names arbitrarily fixed. A name so fixed has no especial connotation of its own. Suppose four sons are born in a family and their father chooses to call one *Nandaka* (gladdener), one *Jīvaka* (the living), one *Aśoka* (sorrowless) and one *Sālaya* (the long lived). It cannot be deduced from these names that one who is called *Nandaka* is actually the person who gladdens, one who is called *Jīvaka* is actually the person who lives, one who is called *Aśoka* is actually the person who is free from sorrow, and one who is called *Sālaya* is actually the person who lives a hundred years. There are certain distinctive moral, intellectual or occupational traits acquired or developed by

<sup>1</sup> *Yathā hi vāṇatā ā bālāḥ kaṃ damarāṃ va śāpāpāṭi*

*pārasupphāṇaṃ anupphāṇaṃ vāṇatā vāṇatāṃ kharatā*

*idāṃ kharatā idāṃ dāṇāḥ dāṇāṃ mātāṃ vāṇatāṃ gītāṃ*

*na va bālāṃ vāṇatāṃ pāṇāṃ va vāṇatāṃ vāṇatāṃ*

*vāṇatāṃ vāṇatāṃ vāṇatāṃ vāṇatāṃ vāṇatāṃ vāṇatāṃ (Dhāvādaṇa p. 625)*

different persons as they grow up in life but these distinctive traits cannot be predicated of persons because of their birth in a certain home and by the union of certain parents (*Diryāśāstra* pp 609—650) The differences that exist among men are primarily individual in character The degree of difference in moral, intellectual and occupational qualities which may be shown to exist between a so-called Brahmin and a so-called *śūdra* may equally be shown to exist between two sons born of the same parents According to time honoured customs of India a Brahmin is allowed to marry from all the four castes a *Kṣatriya* from three a *Vaiśya* from two and a *śūdra* from one only which is his own caste Thus a Brahmin may be the father of four sons by his four wives from different castes the son gaining the social status of his mother There is no invariable law that given equal chances the son by the Brahmin mother will excel one born by the *śūdra* mother The status of the four sons is determined arbitrarily

It is claimed that the Brahmin is generated from the mouth of Brahmā the *Kṣatriya* from the thigh the *Vaiśya* from the navel and the *śūdra* from the feet Thus is only an allegory which is not suggestive of any congenital difference between a Brahmin and a *Kṣatriya* between a *Kṣatriya* and a *Vaiśya* or between a *Vaiśya* and a *śūdra* The allegory rather suggests that the difference had originated in the difference in the training and occupation That is to say, it is the *karma* which determines the difference among men in social status There is no such certitude that a Brahmin will be reborn after his death in the *brahmaloka* because he is a Brahmin and a *śūdra* will be reborn in a lower world because he is a *śūdra* The destiny of each person is individually determined by his good or bad deeds

At the time of the Buddha Goutama there were four classes of the people viz *Khattiyas*, *Brāhmanas*, *Vessas* and *Suddas* They were known as *cattaro varṇā* or the four castes *Varna* literally means colour, some translate it as appearance In the Luckhast books<sup>1</sup> *Khattiyas* have been given preference over the *Brāhmanas* whereas in the Brahmin literature the *Brāhmanas* occupy the first place The *Upanishads* speak of the *Khattiya* superiority and in the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Luckhast Sutta D N I* *Tejivāra Sutta* of *D N* III *Latthakara* ch III



*Chândogya* the superior learning of the *Khattiyas* is frequently referred to. Of these four castes the *Khattiyas* and the *Brâhmanas* have been given precedence in salutation, homage, obeisance and the due ministry.<sup>1</sup> The Buddha did not lay much stress on the caste distinctions which he said were unscientific. In the *Ambastha Sutta* the Buddha is said to have refuted the charge of Ambastha by saying that the *Sakyas* among whom he was born were not menials but *Khattiyas* and that Ambastha, a *Kassāpiana Brâhmana*, was a descendant of a slave girl. Moreover he tried to prove that the *Khattiyas* were superior to the *Brâhmanas*.

*Khattiya* is the lord of the fields. This term means a *Rajâ*<sup>2</sup> which is taken in the sense of a nobleman. There are good and bad nobles. A bad noble deprives a living being of life, is a thief, is unchaste, speaks lies, slanders, uses rough words, is greedy, malevolent, and holds wrong views. A good noble, on the other hand, abstains from murder, theft, unchastity, lying, slandering, gossiping, greed, malevolence and false opinions (*Aggañña Suttanta, Digha N*). It is distinctly stated that the *Khattiyas* are the best of the four classes (cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, 358 SN I 153, II 284 and *Aggañña Sutta*).<sup>3</sup> A son born of a Brâhman maiden by a *Ksatriya* youth was eligible for receiving seat and water as tokens of great respect from the *Brâhmanas* for partaking of the feast offered to the dead or of the food boiled in milk, or of the offerings to gods, or of the food sent as a present for learning the sacred verses of the *Brâhmanas* and marrying *Brâhmana* girls. But he was not allowed to receive the consecration ceremony of a *Ksatriya* because he was not of pure descent on his mother's side. The same privileges could also be enjoyed by one born of a *Ksatriya* maiden by a *Brâhmana* youth (*Ambastha Sutta Digha N I*). It should be noted that if a *Ksatriya* was outlawed by other *Ksatriyas*, he was eligible for enjoying all the privileges mentioned above from the hands of the *Brâhmanas*. So we find that even when a *Ksatriya* had fallen into

<sup>1</sup> *Vajrasa Nikāya* 3 dia so go — Cāṇḍo ne mahābhīṣe vasaṁ — Aṇṇaṁ *Brâhmanā* lokaṁ *Sudda* ita eva āro manāṁ ca catummam ambhāso dāo mame aṇṇam ālābhānti—*Khattiyā* 13 brâhṇa ana ca 13 idam aṇṇaṁ ālābhānti catummamambhāsoṁ ita eva mame aṇṇam.

<sup>2</sup> *Khattiya* 13 itaṁ janaṁ kassama ya jātāpāpānāmo 13 aṇṇaṁ aṇṇamāpāmo so seṭṭho dānānāmo.

the deepest degradation it held good that the *Ksatriyas* were superior and the *Brāhmanas* inferior (Cf. *Maṃḍūkya Nihāya* I 358)

Next we take up the case of the Brahmins who were proud of their caste. It happened that a Brahmin out of homage partook of the leavings of food from the man of the lowest caste but as soon as he had eaten, he thought that he had disgraced his birth, his clan and his family because he had taken the leavings of a churl. His remorse was so very keen that he plunged into the jungle not to show his face to the human world, where he died forlorn (*Jāt*, II 57)

The Brahmins were so very proud of their caste that in one instance we find that a Brahmin when he grew old said to his son thus: Don't let my body be burnt in a cemetery where any outcaste can be burnt, but find some uncontaminated place to burn me in (*Jāt*, Cowell, II 77)

The Pāli literature mentions the following kinds of *Brāhmanas*: (1) *Uddacaddisa Brāhmanas*, i.e. Brahmins who lived in the Northern or North-western country (*Jāt* I 178 216 240, 263) (2) *Kāśi Brāhmanas* i.e. Brahmins who lived at Kāśi (*Jāt* II, 50 56 115), (3) *Brāhmanas of Rājagaha and Magadha* who were very superstitious holding false views and believing in luck (*Jāt* I 215) (4) *Brāhmanas of Bhāradvāja Gotta* (I see *Tevijja Sutta* *Dīgha Nikāya*, I), and (5) *Kankavasa Brāhmanas*<sup>1</sup>. It is one of the famous sayings of the Buddhists —

Foremost in virtue were the men of old  
Those brahmins who remembered ancient rules  
In them well-guarded were the doors of sense  
They had achieved the mastery of wrath  
In meditation and the Norm they took delight  
Those brahmins who remembered ancient rules

(*S N Sālvatana-vagga 'Book of the Kindred Sayings*, IV, p 74)

Brahmins in name there were many but real Brahmins could hardly be found. The *Jātaka* relates a story of the dearth of good and real *Brāhmanas* (*Jāt* Cowell IV 227). In it is given a descrip-

<sup>1</sup> *Vastānāṃ kaṭṭhā nandānaṃ paratāṇāṃ* = makers of mortar and repeaters of mantras. *Dīgha* I 234



greed among the greedy. He must not utter harsh words. He should not foster desire for this world or for the next. He is a Brāhmana who has risen above ties and who is free from sin or impurity. He is pure, serene, undisturbed and bright like the moon. He has abandoned all desires and has conquered all the world. His passions are extinct. He is noble, a hero, a great sage, a conqueror, the accomplished and the awakened. He is perfect in knowledge and he is truly a *sap*. (Vide *Brāhmana-sagga Dhammapada*, pp. 50—60. Cf. *Vāśiṣṭha Sūtra* of the *Sūtra Nipāta*, *Brahmava Sūtra* of the *M N*, the *Brahmana Samyutta* of the *S N*, the *Junassana Sūtra* of the *A N* and so forth.) A true Brahman is he who is immune from the assaults of perception and who has no craving to be reborn either here or elsewhere. He dwells with a clear conscience and without any perplexity.

It is clear, says T. W. Rhys Davids, that the word Brahman in the opinion of the early Buddhists conveyed to the minds of the people an exalted meaning, a connotation of real veneration and respect. He further points out that "if the contention of the Buddhists had been universally accepted, and if the word Brahman had come to mean not only a man of a certain descent but exclusively a man of a certain character and insight, then the present caste system of India could never have grown up. The social supremacy of the Brāhmanas by birth became accepted as an uncontroversial fact and the inflood of popular superstition which overwhelmed the Buddhist movement, overwhelmed also the whole pantheon of the Vedic gods. Buddhism and Brahmanism alike passed practically away and modern Hinduism arose on the ruins of both." (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, pt. I, pp. 140-159.) It is one of the injunctions of the Buddha that every one having certain abilities should be allowed to teach and that if he does teach, he should teach all keeping nothing back and shutting no one out (Introduction to the *Lokuttara Sūtra*, *ibid.* 285). It appears from this that a teacher belonging to a higher caste would not refuse to teach anybody belonging to an inferior caste. It is interesting to note that the Brahmanas at first gave themselves up to meditation. Hence they were called *Jhāyakas*, but some people, being incapable of enduring meditation in forest leaf-huts, engaged themselves in writing books; hence they were called *Ajjhāyakas*, or the repeaters of the Vedas.

The Brahmins had their fivefold code for achieving the ideal. This code consists of (1) The Truth (*sacca*) (2) Austerities (*tapas*) (3) Chastity (*brahmacariya*) (4) Study (of Vedic lore) and Munificence (*cāga*) — i.e., to the Brahmins (Lord Chalmers, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha* I p. vii)

Service was divided into four by the Brāhmanas: service of a Brahmin, of a noble, of a middle class man, and of a peasant. Any member of all four classes might serve a Brahmin. A noble might be served by another noble or by a middle class man or by a peasant. A middle class man might be served by another middle-class man or by a peasant, and a peasant might be served only by a peasant. The Buddha refuted this selfish classification of the Brahmins and based his contention on moral and ethical grounds alone. In the opinion of the Buddha, one should not assert that all services are to be rendered or that all services are to be refused. If the service makes one bad and not good, it should not be rendered. But if it makes him better and not worse, then it should be rendered. This is the guiding consideration which should decide the conduct of Brahmins, nobles, middleclass men and peasants. The Buddha further points out that lineage does not enter into a man's living either good or bad (*Ēsuhāṇi Sutta of M N*, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, II p. 100)

It appears from the comparative frequency of the discussions on the matter of Brahman pretensions, that the subject of caste was a burning problem at the time of the composition of the *Nikāyas*. No other social problem is referred to so often, and the Brahmins would not be so often represented as expressing astonishment or indignation at the position taken up regarding it by the early Buddhists unless there had really been a serious difference on the subject between the two schools. But the difference, though real, has been gravely misunderstood. As Rhys Davids has said: "The disastrous effects from the ethical, social and political points of view of these restrictions and of caste as a whole have been often grossly exaggerated and the benefits of the system ignored. And we are entirely unwarranted in supposing the system as it now exists, to have been in existence also at the time when Buddhism arose in the valley of the Ganges. Our knowledge of the actual facts of caste even as it now exists is still confused and inaccurate. The theories

put forward to explain the facts are loose and irreconcilable.<sup>1</sup> There was a common phrase current among the people which divided all the world into four *varnas* (colours or complexions). The priests put themselves first and had a theological legend in support of their contention. But it is clear from the *Pitakas* that this was not admitted by the nobles. And it is also clear that no one of these divisions was a caste. There was neither *consuetudo* nor *commensality* \*between all members of one *varna* nor was there a governing council for each.

The fourth was distinguished from the other by social position. And though in a general rough way the classification corresponded to the actual facts of life, there were insensible gradations within the four classes and the boundary between them was both variable and undefined. The theory of caste or *jāti* easily breaks down when we see that a Brahmin and a *Chandala* do not differ from their physical constitution and can procreate children.

*Mahākaccāna* was asked by King *Avantiputta* of Madhura as to the Brahminical claim that the Brahmins were superior to all other castes. The king said: The Brahmins maintain that they alone form the superior class, all other classes being inferior. The Brahmins alone form the white class, all other classes being black. That purity resides in Brahmins alone and not in non-Brahmins, and that Brahmins are Brahmin's legitimate sons born from his mouth, offsprings of his creations of his and his heirs. *Kaccāna* convinced him of the equal footing of all the four classes inasmuch as any member of the four classes could, when he had grown rich and wealthy, employ any member of any of the other three classes as servants.

The emptiness of the Brahmin claim to superiority is shown by the fact that if any one, be he a noble Brahmin, *Vessa* or *Sudda*, kills, robs, lies, slanders, covets, harbours ill will, is of bitter tongue, or has a wrong outlook, he after death must pass to a state of misery or woe, or to purgatory. The same misery awaits each one who is guilty of such crimes. It is also demonstrated by the fact that if any one, be he a noble, a middle class man or a peasant, abstains from the crimes noted above, he passes after death to bliss and

<sup>1</sup> *Discussions of the Suttas* pt. I pp. 16—17.

heaven. It can further be proved by the fact that if any one be he a Brahman a noble a middle class man or a peasant is a burglar thief or house breaker, he is equally punished by the ruler of the realm irrespective of the caste of the accused. It is also apparent from the fact that he, whether Brahman Vessa or Sudda who cuts off his hair and beard, and dons the yellow robes and goes from house to house as a pilgrim abstaining from killing stealing and lying eating but one meal a day and living the higher life in virtue and goodness, such a one is honoured and respected and provided with all the necessities of life. (*Madhura Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikaya* II pp 83—90 (p *Avalambana Sutta* *M N* II pp 147 foll, and *Esakāhi Sutta* *M N*, II, pp 177 foll where the Brahman pretensions are also discussed). Thus we find that the *Madhura Sutta* deals with caste system under five heads. It teaches that caste cannot ensure material success in life, cannot save the wicked from punishment hereafter, cannot debar the good from bliss hereafter, cannot shield the evil-doers from criminal law, and cannot affect the uniform veneration extended to the monk, whether he be sprung from the highest or the lowest of the four castes. In all these important respects the four castes are equal. Lord Chalmers is right in pointing out that this *sutta* does not go on to state, nor does any other *sutta* venture to state, that in every possible respect the four castes were on one identical footing of equality. Such a statement would have evinced a certain blindness to facts for although in all essentials caste was not an empty name to the Buddha yet the distinctions of caste had a residual sphere of activity and ranked among the accidents of life. Whilst caste had no part in the higher life and was irrelevant in the less trivial of mundane relations yet there undoubtedly remained the region where in the absence of higher qualifications the hereditary distinctions of caste were accepted as an appropriate differentia between little men. But into this trivial region Gautama disdained to enter. He was content to explode the caste theory without denouncing it as a formal institution (Fak *J R* 15, 1894, p 348).

Brahman wives of Brāhmanas have their periods and they are subject to conception. How then can the Brahmins claim to be born of Brahmā's mouth? In the Yonakamboja and other adjacent countries, there are only two classes, masters and slaves. A master

can become a slave and vice versa. This does not at all lend any support to the Brahman's claim. It is clear therefore, that the caste system of the Brahmans did not prevail in the Yonakamboja region.

Not only a Brahman but a man of other three classes can develop in his heart the love that knows no hate or ill. Not only a Brahman, but a man of other three classes also can go down to the river with his string of red bath balls to shampoo himself and rub off the dust and dirt. The fire kindled by any one of the four classes blazes up with a bright flame and serves the purpose of a fire. When a son is born to a young noble and a Brahman maiden, he is styled both a noble and a Brahman; when a son is born to a noble maiden and a young Brahman, he is styled both a Brahman and a noble. Between two *uttama* Brahman brothers, of whom one is an educated scholar and the other not educated, Brahmans generally give preference to the educated one in making gifts; but if the educated one is wicked and profligate and the uneducated one is virtuous, the Brahmans generally give preference to the uneducated man. Therefore the standard of distinction between *varṇa* and *jāna* depends on purity and goodness (cp. *Isakyaṇa Sūtra*, *M N* II 147—157). Here also we find that the Buddha speaks against the Brahmanical pretensions that the Brahmans are superior to all other castes (cf. *alpa Cāra* Sūtra II 164—177 where also the Buddha condemns the Brahmanical pretensions as to their superiority).

In the 6th or 5th century B.C. the Brāhmanas took up higher occupations to earn their livelihood. They acted as chaplains (*Jātaka* IV 188) ministers<sup>1</sup> and courtiers (*Jāt* II 166). The Brahmans also followed such lower professions as hunters (*Jāt* II 14, III, 276), who used to kill many deer and live on them; carpenters (*Jāt* IV 129) who used to bring wood from the forest and make carts; goatherds (*Jāt* III 242) and snake-charmers (*Jāt* IV 283).

We find many instances of greediness of the Brahmans in Buddhist literature. The Brāhmanas thought evulantly of large sums of money and large supplies of food. They sought in the dreams of kings presents for sacrifices and personal gain (*Jāt* I 187, cf. *Jāt* I 255, where the Brāhmanas are described as a greedy lot). The

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the Brahmins also enjoyed the privilege of being ministers to the king (*Jātaka* III 102).



Buddha, while at Jetavana, spoke about a Brahman retained by the King of Kosala who had the power of telling which swords were lucky, but who was very greedy. The Brahman made it a rule only to commend the work of those smiths who gave him presents, while he rejected the work of those who did not bribe him (*Jāt* I, 277). A Brahman who was appointed as a judge by the King of Benares was addicted to accepting bribes (*Jāt* VI 69).

The Brahman students like the Ksatriyas, were admitted into the University of Taxila. They were like the Ksatriyas taught the three Vedas and various arts (*Jāt* III 105).

The Vessas were the trading people. In the Buddhist literature their position was next to the Brāhmanas (cf. *Aggañña Sutta*, *Dīgha Nikāya* III). They adopted the married state and set on foot various trades. The Jātakas contain references to such trading people and trading families (cf. *Jāt* II 16, 190).

The Suddas come next to the Vessas. They were known in the Buddhist age as slaves as opposed to freemen. Children born to such slaves were also slaves. We hear of them quite occasionally as domestic servants in the houses of the rich (*Jāt* (Fausbøll) IV 200). According to the *Aggañña Sutta*, those who took to hunting and such degrading pursuits were known as Suddas (the lowest grade of folk). *Vāsabhakkhatti*—a daughter of a slave girl who became the consort of the King of Kosala, was degraded, together with her son *Viddābha* because they were of servile rank (*Jāt* I 27 and see also *Jāt* IV 91). It is interesting to note that the name of a noble family should not be given to a slave girl's bastard child. It happened that a chaplain fell in love with a slave girl who conceived and enquired of him as to the name by which the child should be called. The chaplain replied that—My dear, here is a tree called *Uddāka*, and you may name the child as *Uddāka*. It can never be that the name of a noble family should be given to a bastard child of a slave girl (*Jāt* IV p. 186).

Besides these four classes there were lower classes such as *sandakas* (*puṭṭ*) *rasas* *caras*, *accāsa*, *raṭṭhāras* potters, weavers, leather workers, barbers, mat-makers, fishermen, drummers (*dharmadāsa kula* *Jāt* I 146) *conchabharas* (*sakkhadhamakula* *Jāt* I 147) ploughmen or cultivators (*Jāt* I 168) greengrocers, carters, water-carriers, field-labourers (*Jāt* III 207) etc. It is true that

the *śūnas* the *śūndās* and the *śaṅkhās* were undoubtedly aboriginal tribesmen who were hereditary craftsmen. So also in the case of matmakers, potters, weavers, leather-workers and water-carriers who adopted low occupations from generation to generation undoubtedly all these were *śūndās* or low caste people. In the Buddhist age a barber was rewarded by the King with a village (*Jāt* I, 30). A true believing barber was allowed to listen to the Master's discourse and enter the *Saṅgha*. It appears from this that there was no bar for a man of lower name to come to listen to the Buddha's *dhamma* (*Jāt* II, 4).

Mention is made of a *candāla* village which was inhabited by low-caste *candālas* only (*Jāt* IV, 124). There was a belief in Buddha's time that the *candālas* used to bring bad luck to those who saw them (*Jāt* IV, 235). The *candālas* had their own manner of speech and their own language. There was a *candāla* village outside Uppan (*Jāt* IV, 244). The *candālas* were not admitted into the University of Taxila. Two *candāla* brothers went to study at Taxila, posing as Brahmins but when they were found out they were expelled (*Jāt* IV, 244). The *candālas* were so much hated by the Brahmins that some among them on account of having tasted the food of a *candāla* were put out of caste (*Jāt* IV, 235). A *candāla* is described as having been able to secure as he wished, the beautiful lady *Dutthamangalika* daughter of a prosperous merchant. The lady was kept in the *candāla* settlement outside the city without transgressing in any way the rules of caste. A son of this beautiful lady, when he was seven or eight years old learned the three Vedas and at sixteen practised charities to the Brahmins (*Jāt* IV, 235). There is an instance where we find how a wise and learned *candāla* was badly treated by a *Brāhmana* (*Jāt* III, 153).

A young Brahmin learnt a charm from a low-caste *candāla*. When once asked by the King as to the name of the teacher from whom he had learnt it he felt shame to say that he had learnt it from a low-caste *candāla* and spoke falsely before the King. Instantly the charm was gone. The Brahmin spoke to the King the truth. Hearing this the King thought within himself 'When one has a treasure so priceless what has birth to do with it?'

According to the Buddha people belonging to high or low caste could attain arahatship. There are instances in the Pāli literature

where we find that a ploughman or a cultivator attained arahatship (*Jāt* I, 108) a fisherman's son was admitted into the order and he afterwards won the glory of arahatship (*Jāt* I, 109) A careful study of the *Theragāthā* and its commentary, will convince one of the fact that people belonging to different castes, from the highest aristocracy to the lowest scavenger lived together in fraternal affection and equanimity and won the highest bliss (see my *History of Pāli Literature* pp 500 foll.) Any person belonging to the lower caste, as for example *sandaka* was not eligible for kingship A *sandaka* simply because he was a *sandaka* was not made a king It was distinctly stated that had he been of a higher caste he would have been made a king (*Jāt* III 18)

At the time of the Buddha we meet with several instances where marriage took place among the candidates of equal rank A gentleman of a country near Sāvattthi asked in marriage for his son a young Sāvattthian girl of equal rank (*Jāt* I 124) A Brahmin was married to a bride of his own rank (*Jāt* I, 202) The daughter of a lay sister at Sāvattthi was married to a husband of the same caste (*Jāt* I 294) A Buddha had a beautiful daughter when she grew up she was married into a family 'as good as her own' (*Jāt* II 158) A Brahmin householder of Benares had a son and a daughter when the son grew up his father brought a wife home for him from a family of equal rank (*Jāt* III 108) There is an example of *asavarna* marriage (marriage outside *varna* or caste) in the case of the daughter of the chief gulfand maker of Sāvattthi, named Mallikā marrying Pasenadi the King of Kosala (*Jāt* III 244)

*Gahapati*, or householder may be found among the classes already mentioned In the Pāli literature the word *Kassambhū* occurs (*Jāt* I 105 *Jāt* II, 266) which means a landowner (and a country squire) It may refer to a landowner belonging to any caste, but in the case of Brāhmanas the term *Brāhmanagahapati*, or 'Brahmin householders' occurs in several places in Pāli literature for example *Amaraṇa Brāhmanagahapati* p. in *Jāt* I p 506 (Fairball)

## ARTYASACCAS

In the Theravāda and Sāvasthivāda doctrines the *Āryasaukya* or Four Noble Truths are regarded as the quintessence of Buddhism as propounded by the Master himself. It is categorically asserted in the *Piṭakopadesa*<sup>1</sup> that all that was uttered by the Buddha from the day of his enlightenment to that of his great decease, all that he propounded in the form of a *sūtra* or a *gāthā* or a *vyākaraṇa* or a *śāstra* or an *edāna*, all fall within the scope of the Four Noble Truths.

The Sutta which embodies them in their authoritative form is known as the *Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta*. This Sutta is entertained by tradition as *Parivara Dhammasutta* and of the very first public statement of Buddha's position as a teacher and thinker. There is little doubt that the text of this discourse is highly important in the history of Buddhism as a definite formulation of Buddha's doctrine from the orthodox point of view. The *Bravakas* as generally interpreted consist of the following four items of truth: (1) *Dukkha* commonly translated as suffering; (2) *Dukkha-samudaya* commonly translated as origin of suffering; (3) *Dukkha-nirodha* cessation of suffering; and (4) *Dukkha-nirodha-gamini-patipada* the path leading to the cessation of suffering. Birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair are mentioned as common instances of suffering as generally understood in the world in which we live. Union with persons or things a person does not like or separation from persons or things a person likes is said to be suffering from the mental point of view. To put it in another form, suffering is a painful feeling which arises from getting what one does not desire to get and not getting what one desires to get, in short, from disappointment. The entire position taken

In the text, the negative statement alone is considered to be sufficient.

up in respect of the first item is reduced to this "*Samkhittassa pañcūpādasaṅkhānānaṃ dukkhā*", 'the five aggregates of attachment constitute suffering

In the traditional exposition each of the terms birth, death and the rest, is carefully defined. Birth is defined as a particular biological process of development of an individual in a certain species of living beings. Decay is defined as a biological process of infirmity along with the maturity attained by an individual in a particular form of birth. Death is defined as a tragic biological end of an individual in life, resulting from the arrest of vital functions. Sorrow is defined as a mental process of grieving due to the sense of a great loss either of kinsmen or of wealth or of health or of character or of a cherished belief. Lamentation is defined as a verbal expression of sorrow felt in the heart. Pain is defined as bodily uneasiness or discomfort. Misery is nothing but a mental uneasiness or disagreeable feeling. Despair consists in utter dejection of spirit resulting from the sense of great loss beyond recovery. By association is meant contact coming together union and mixing with. Further explanation follows which tends to show that birth or decay or death is not in itself suffering. Suffering arises from a sense of disappointment. A person for instance wishes may it be that I shall not be subject to the contingency of birth, but the contingency actually arises in spite of his wishes to the contrary. Thus the question of suffering is unwisely bound up with men's wish or desire in regard to certain things. All such things in connection with which his wish or desire comes into play are summed up by the five aggregates of attachment.

Thus from the consideration of the first item of truth one is led to the second concerning the origin of suffering.

The origin of suffering lies in *Taṇhā* defined as craving which is potent for rebirth accompanied by lust and self-indulgence seeking satisfaction now here and now there. There are three kinds of craving: (1) the craving for pleasures of the senses, (2) the craving for becoming and (3) the craving for not-becoming.

From the consideration of the second item one is left to consider the third concerning the cessation of suffering. The cessation of suffering consists in utter fading away and attenuation of that very craving. *Aroddha* is cessation without any possibility of rebirth.

Craving in its varying forms and various aspects arises in connection with the senses and their respective objects. Where the senses external and internal do not come into relation with their objects craving finds no outlet for self-expression. *Nirodha* is therefore that state of the self in which consciousness transcends the sphere of senses and their objects.

If the cessation of suffering is a truth beyond dispute further question arises: what is the Path leading to the cessation of suffering? This path is called the Noble Eightfold Path. It consists in right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. The right view is defined as knowledge in respect of the four items of truth. The right resolve is a resolve to renounce, to get rid of hatred and harming. The right speech consists in abstinence from lying, slandering, use of harsh language and vain talk. The right action consists in abstinence from taking life, stealing and immoral sexual indulgence. The right livelihood consists in following a proper means of existence. The right effort is an honest and earnest effort made to check the rise of immoral states that have not yet arisen, to put a stop to the immoral states that have arisen, to produce the moral states that have not as yet arisen and to preserve and strengthen the moral states that have already arisen. The right mindfulness consists in the practice of the four-fold prescribed mode of *sati-paṭhāna*. And the right concentration consists in the successful practice of the prescribed mode of *jhāna*.

The formulation of the four truths proceeded on the basis of the doctrine of *Paccasamuppāda* accounting for the origin and cessation of the entire mass of ill. The four truths as formulated in the *Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta* represent a definite procedure or schema of thought. This procedure was not, of course peculiar to Buddhism. A similar procedure was equally followed in other branches of knowledge e.g. the Śākhya system of Philosophy, the science of medicine and the science of wealth. It is not difficult to see, says Kern, 'that these four *satyas* are nothing else but the four cardinal articles of Indian medical science applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the *Yoga* doctrine'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kern *Journal of Indian Studies* etc. pp. 46-47 quotes *Yogasūtra* II 15. Comm. *satyaṁ ca'nyatā-Sāra' ita evaiva yāta m e nyatā' for ā' ita e bhāsi*



anything which is mundane or mental. To reach this state is to be out of touch with the object of every description. *Jhāna* or *samādhi* is the tried mode of reaching that state of consciousness in this present conscious experience.

*Jhāna* or *samādhi* is the main point in the Noble Eightfold Path, the remaining seven points being directly or indirectly connected with the last point. The right view and the right resolve representing as they do the first two points are nothing but rightly focussing the attention and rightly directing the course of the will. The right speech, the right action and the right livelihood taken together are the three points that are concerned with the means of purifying one's conduct thereby removing obstacles in the path to *samādhi*. The right effort signifies the means of consciously determining the character of the motive in practising *jhāna* or *samādhi*. The right mindfulness represents the tried means of inducing the *jhāna* mood and cultivating mental awareness of all experiences that occur in the course of meditation. A great stress is laid in Buddhism on the perfection of the method of attaining to that free and pure state of consciousness.

It will be noted that *dukkha* is nowhere postulated as a permanent feature of reality. It is admitted and entertained only as a possible contingency in life as it is generally lived. *Nirodha* representing as it does the free and pure state of consciousness is posited as the ultimate nature of reality. The procedure of thought which has been followed does not admit of the consideration of the question whether Buddhism is pessimism or optimism. Among all the Buddhist sects or schools the *kukkulikas* are said to have taken up a position leading to a pessimistic construction of existence (*sabbā samāhāre dukkhā*).<sup>1</sup> But this was not universally accepted by the Buddhists.

<sup>1</sup> *Form and Function of Buddhism*, Freytag's note p. xlii.



## CHAPTER V

### ARIYA ATTHANGIKA MAGGA

#### (The Noble Eightfold Path)

We have seen that in the architectonic of Buddhist thought as represented by the noble truths, the fourth stem is the Path leading to the cessation of suffering. This path is called the Noble Eightfold Path — the *Āriya Atthangika Magga*. This is otherwise called *Maṃḥimā paṭipadā* or the Middle Path. The Aśokan expression *majham patipādeyaṃ ti* (S R E) that we will fulfil the mean enables us to understand that the term *maṃḥimā paṭipadā* rendered

'Middle Path', is rather a misleading coinage. All that king Aśoka wanted his officials to do was to fulfil the *maṃḥa* or mean — to realise the ideal of a *via media*. In the expression *Maṃḥima-paṭipadā*, on the other hand *maṃḥima* or middle stands as an adjective qualifying *paṭipadā* or path. To explain it in the light of Aśoka's phrase the Pāli expression must be taken to mean that it is a definite course of thought or of conduct by which the ideal of *Maṃḥa* may be realised. Some such thought developed also in the political thought of Ancient India. According to the earlier opinion the kings were to carry on their administration on a strict principle, being relentless in method (*akṛ-śikṣa*). According to the later and more rational opinion, the kings were to follow a principle of polity which is neither too strict nor too lenient (*akṛ-śikṣaḥ saṃhṛ-śikṣa*). In other words, the political wisdom according to the later opinion lay in striking the golden mean between the two extremes. It may now be taken for granted that in many of the Pāli passages the term met with is not *maṃḥimā* but *maṃḥa* and that wherever the term *maṃḥa* is introduced it is introduced as a golden mean between two extremes (*śreṇi* and). In all these references one may note that *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is mentioned as a formula of thought by which the desired mean can really be fulfilled. Aśoka in his Separate Rock Edict (Dhauli) says 'Well propounded is the principle thus — If any person suffers from arrest or restraint which

eventually ends in imprisonment<sup>1</sup> many other persons become thereby deeply aggrieved. There you must aim at this — namely that you will fulfil the mean. You are not to proceed under these (immoral) dispositions: envy, distemper, cruelty, impatience, want of application, laziness and lethargy.

The *mapka* aimed at by Asoka is a mean between these two extremes, of which one is represented by richness (*āśūlpa*) and the other by laziness (*ālasya*). By *Maṅgala-pāṭipadā mapka* or mean in the *Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta* is sought to be avoided or evaded in so far as the verbal expression goes, the two extremes being (1) the method of attaining salvation by thoughtless indulgence in the affairs of lust (*saṃsārā kamasakkalikkamaṃ vega*), and (2) the method of attaining salvation by the rigorous practice of self-mortification (*attakāyamaṅgaṃ vega*). In the doctrine of the Middle Path the totality of these two methods is sought to be brought out in many ways and in many places. The thoughtless indulgence in the affairs of lust is the way of the common run of men and the rigorous practice of self-mortification is the traditional way of the extreme type of ascetics.

The first kind of life is illustrated in the *Asvaparivṛtana Sutta*<sup>2</sup> by the life lived by the Bodhi-satta as prince Siddhārtha. The second kind of life is exemplified in the *Vāṇīśānanda Sutta*<sup>3</sup> by the life lived by the same Bodhi-satta as an *āśāka* or *ijjāka* after he had renounced the world.

So far as English phraseology goes, golden mean is just the expression which verbally fits in with the Buddhist *Mapka* or *Madhya*. The Golden mean is the middle course between the two extremes — a wise moderation. But the golden mean which the Buddhist has aimed at is reachable by various degrees of approach from two sides. That is to say, the conception and formulation of the golden mean in Buddhism became possible after many centuries.

<sup>1</sup> For a full statement, under reference, on Mr. Bown's interpretation of *saṃsārā kamasakkalikkamaṃ* see to mention that *saṃsāra* was against persons living the world and becoming monks. But the word *saṃsārā kamasakkalikkamaṃ* is hardly meant something which could be achieved and not that which is at *At Dhammicāyā samsāra* affirming, which culminates in death (*āśāka* II *abhiṅga* *saṃsāra* *āśāka* p. 12).

<sup>2</sup> *Mapka* *Viṇaya* I p. 160.

<sup>3</sup> *Mapka* *Viṇaya* I pp. 69-70.

of evolution of religious life and thought of India without reference to which its historical significance cannot be truly realised. A suggestion has been recently made that it is not so much by avoidance or evasion of the two extremes as by bringing out in essence the significance of each trodden or proposed path that the Buddhist ideal of the golden mean may be fulfilled. The underlying spirit of this doctrine of the golden mean<sup>1</sup> in Buddhism has been well expressed in the following verse of the *Dhammapadam* verse 141 —

*'Na naggacariyā na jātā ca paṇḍā  
nandaka thandilasāyika ca  
rajo ca jallam ukkatisappadhānam  
sodhenti maccam asāminakamham*

, Not by nakedness not by plaited hair not by dust not by fasting, not by lying on the bare ground not by rubbing with dust and not by sitting motionless one can purify oneself, if one is not free from desire

This 'golden mean' served as the guiding principle to the whole of the Vinaya discipline according to which, the life of the Buddhist Holy Order was to be moulded. The desired effect sought to be produced was to shift the emphasis from things external to the purity internal.<sup>2</sup> The Noble Eightfold Path was propounded as a well-tested method of attaining the internal purity of the self.

The first two factors in this method are *sammādiṭṭhi* and *sammā-samkappā* commonly rendered right view and right resolve. *Sammādiṭṭhi* as used in this context is otherwise called *asāparisā-dassanā* or a view or belief which is not contrary to truth. Here *sammādiṭṭhi* conveys the sense of faith or belief rather than that of any metaphysical view or theory. It is precisely in some such sense that the Jains use the term *sammādamana*. As explained in the *Pāli Sāleyyakasutta* <sup>3</sup> (p. 288) *sammādiṭṭhi* suggests an article of faith which is contrary to that which was inculcated by Ajitakeśakambhī and his followers. This article of faith consists in the acceptance of the belief that there is such a thing as gift that there is such a thing as sacrifice, that there is such a thing as oblation to fire that there are such things as results immediate and remote of deeds, well-done and ill-done, this world the other world mother

<sup>1</sup> *Maykhana Nidāya* Vol. I p. 39. *śaśū āhāraś caśāraś ca*

<sup>2</sup> *Maykhana Nidāya* Vol. I pp. 285 foll.

father adventitious birth, and such well gifted and well accomplished religious teachers who truly declare the nature of this and the other world after having realised it through their higher perception or intuition<sup>1</sup> and *succāditthi* suggests an attitude of faith just contrary to this.<sup>2</sup> There cannot be *sammāditthi* or right faith unless there is a clear pre-perception of the moral intellectual or spiritual situation which is going to arise. In other words *sammāditthi* is that form of faith which is only a stepping-stone to *pañña* or knowledge. It is the faith or conviction acquired by a Buddhist *sotāpanna* or 'stream-attainer' who is sure to reach the goal. Once you lay hold of the first factor which is *sammāditthi* you are sure to arrive at the last factor namely, *sammasamādhi* which is right concentration, the approved means of attaining *asaddhi* or purity, and *vamāsi* or emancipation. *Sammā-samkāppe* or right resolve represents just the will-aspect of the Buddhist faith. It conveys in right direction of the will towards the goal. Some of the earlier Upanishads teach that all that a *myn samasthi* desires to attain comes to the fulfilment from the very *samkalpa* or determination of will (*nam hāmam hamayati: so asya samkalpādāsa samut-tīkṣate tena sampannak mahīyate*).

The next three factors namely, *sammā-vācā* (right speech), *sammā-kammanto* (right work) and *sammā-ājīva* (right livelihood) constitute the well-trieed method of the attainment of moral purity (*sīla-asaddhi*). The moral purity is not to be viewed as an end in itself but only a means to an end and the end in view is no other than cultivation of mental purity (*pañña-asaddhi*) which is attainable by means of the remaining three factors namely, *sammā-vāyāsa* (right effort), *samma-sati* (right mindfulness), and *sammā samādhi* (right concentration).<sup>3</sup> Conduct or external behaviour is only an outward expression of the moral state (*cetasika dhammā*)<sup>4</sup> which constitute man's internal character. Unless that is thoroughly purified by mindfulness meditation, concentration and introspection the attempt will be like preventing the future growth of a tree simply by cutting it down on the surface leaving the roots

<sup>1</sup> *Majjhima Nikāya* Vol I p. 288

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid* p. 287

<sup>3</sup> *Majjhima* Vol I p. 146

<sup>4</sup> *Tiśuddhimagga* Vol I p. 7 *Paṭisambhaddīmagga* I p. 44



## CHAPTER VI

### JHĀNA

(Meditation)

"In the words *jhāna* 'contemplation, and *samādhi* 'rapt concentration' says Mrs Rhys Davids<sup>1</sup> are contained the expression of that self-training in selective intensive work of mind in which the Indian sought by changing the usual conditions and procedure in cognition to induce consciousness of a higher or different power. *Jhāna* or ecstatic training was a very long standing practice similar to the *Yoga* of the Hindus and the four *jhānas* consist in the process of systematic elimination of factors in consciousness.

Buddhaghosa, evidently following the authority of the *Dhammasaṅgani* speaks of five *jhānas* a somewhat later classification which had developed out of the four *jhānas* described and differentiated in the *Sutta* portion of the Pāli canon. The four or five *jhānas* constitute a category by themselves and in many of the *Suttas* they are relegated to the *rūpāraṇa* sphere of consciousness. In the *Abhidhammatika-Saṅgaha* the five *jhānas* are mentioned as equally holding good in the case of the *lokuttara* state of consciousness. It is not however clearly stated anywhere in this authoritative Buddhist Manual why they should not also hold good in the case of the *kāma-rāga* or the *arūpa-rāga* sphere. The discrimination made in favour of two out of the four *arāyas* would seem to have been an arbitrary procedure of thought. The four or five *jhānas* considered apart from the four *arāyas* signify nothing else than four or five stages in a process of *jhāna* from its inception to its termination in the attainment of a state of trance (*samāpatti*). Altogether five factors are involved in each process of *jhāna* at its inception, namely *vitakka* *vicāra* *piṭi* *sukha* and *ekaggatā*. The first factor *vitakka* is rendered initial application as it directs its concomitant properties towards the object. *Viśāra* is rendered sustained application

<sup>1</sup> *Buddhist Psychology*, and *Id.* pp. 94—95

because it 'permits the continued ex-cess of the thought on the object' *Piñ* is that factor in consciousness which creates an interest in the same object. *Sukha* the fourth factor is nothing but pleasurable, easeful and happy feeling which results from the attainment of the condition sought for and *ekaggatā* is the element of individualisation which develops from time to time into *samādhi*. Thus *ekaggatā* remains a common factor throughout the *jhāna* process. It is indeed the most essential condition of the entire process of *jhāna*. The so-called four or five *jhānas* signify no more than the four or five successive stages of the *jhāna* thought.

In the first stage of meditation five elements viz *vitakka*<sup>1</sup> *vicāra* *piñ*<sup>2</sup>, *sukha* and *ekaggatā* are present. In the second stage the first two are eliminated. In the third the first three are eliminated leaving *sukha* and *ekaggatā*. In the fourth *sukha* is replaced by *sphulbbhā* and there remain two elements viz *sphulbbhā* and *ekaggatā*. There is not much difference between these two sets of meditation. In the second stage of the first set of meditations *vitakka* and *vicāra* disappear simultaneously but in the second set of meditations they disappear one after another thus giving opportunity for another stage. The third, fourth and fifth stages of the second set of meditations correspond to the second, third and fourth stages of the first set.

As regards right concentration (*samādi samādhi*) Buddhaghosa describes it as concentration on good thought. It is so called because in *samādhi* all thoughts are simultaneously and rightly centred on a particular subject. Its characteristic is absence of distraction its immediate cause is firmness and its remote cause is happiness. *Samādhi* has been variously divided according to its predominant characteristics. Regarding the purity and impurity of *samādhi* Buddhaghosa points out that the condition which leads to its excellence causes its purity while that which causes deterioration

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<sup>1</sup> *Vitakka* is the directing of consciousness upon an object and *vicāra* is the attitude of consciousness towards the object and *vitakka* is *ekaggatā* the mental property by which the object of consciousness is necessarily regarded as an individual occupying a definite position in space or time or in both and is formal in individuality of an object. *See 'Sāma Samādi' in 'Sāma Samādi' pp. 20-21.*

<sup>2</sup> *Viññāna* an interest in an object.

brings about its impurity. Buddhaghosa says that there are two ways of practising *samādhi* viz. *lokiya* and *lokuttara*. The practice of *lokiya samādhi* is but the culture of wisdom while the practice of *lokiya samādhi* consists in purifying one's own conduct, establishing one-self in the purified conduct, destroying the ten obstacles, adopting the practice of one of the forty *kammathānas*, avoiding living in a manner unsuitable to the practice of meditation, destroying the minor impediments and applying oneself to the perfect practice of meditation. It really means concentrative meditation. It is of an intensive attention i.e. of concentration, establishing of consciousness exclusively and voluntarily on any single object.<sup>1</sup>

It would seem that Buddhaghosa takes *samādhi* almost in the same sense as *jhāna* in contradistinction of the usual sense in which the term *samādhi* is employed and understood in Indian literature. We have suggested above that *samādhi* or *samapatti* marks the close of a period in the continued process of *jhāna*. The states of *samādhi* or trance are to be conceived as so many halting stations on the road. At each of these states there is a stop, so to speak, of the thought-process in *jhāna*. The state is reached by two stages, namely *upāna* or access and *appāna* or consummation. A new period begins when another *ārambha* or object engages the attention and mind is concentrated thereon. After having gone through five stages, there occurs another state of trance and so on.

The Pāli texts usually speak of nine *samāpattis* or states of *samādhi*, the first eight of which are said to have been reached or experienced by the Indian teachers already before the advent of the Buddha, while the ninth state called *sāmaśamādhivimokkha* was reached for the first time by the Buddha himself.<sup>2</sup> The period extending from the eighth to the ninth is broadly subdivided into eight stages or eight degrees of *lokuttara jhāna*. It is expressly mentioned in the *Abhidhammasaṅgaha* the thought-process in *jhāna* proceeds in the same manner as in the earlier stages. According to Buddhist treatment of the subject the *Kamāvacara* represents the non-jhānic or non-reflective sphere of thought. It denotes a level of consciousness when the subject is in touch with external objects as cognised

<sup>1</sup> *Maṅgala* III pp. 71-78.

<sup>2</sup> *Maṅgala* i. *Atthya* Vol. I p. 206.



through the senses the objects themselves being regarded as things belonging to an external order governed by its own *dhamma* (law of happening.) In other words the nine *samāpatti*s are attainable in three higher spheres of thought and three higher levels of consciousness namely the *rūpāvacara* the *arūpā vacara* and the *lokuttara* the first four in the *rūpāvacara* the next four in the *arūpā vacara* and the last in the *lokuttara*. These spheres of thought and levels of consciousness also constitute so many successive planes of direct experience. Thus the intensification of the degrees of concentration of mind is determined by the nature of the *dhamma* or object. The further the mind travels away from the objects of sense the percepts and images the deeper is the concentration. The *jhana* thus considered is to be viewed as a passage of thought from object to object until a complete isolation from all objects bodily or mental is accomplished. The idea of isolation is expressed by such terms as *sevika* (abstraction) or *avutti* (abst.) It is also a process of self-purification through a gradual elimination of all disturbing and distressing factors in consciousness. The nature of the ninth *samāpatti* called *sāttvika-dharmasamāpatti* in which the feeling of *avutti* or the realisation of *nibbāna* is possible is hinted at in the *Cullavedalla Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (Vol. I). In this *Sutta* we are told that the state of trance is reached by the cessation first of *vācīsaṅkhāra* (vocal functions) next of *kāyasaṅkhāra* (vital functions) and lastly of *vitakkaṅkhāra* (mental functions). And inversely when the normal state of the individual is restored there begins first the mental function next the vital function and lastly the vocal function. We are further told that when consciousness enters into this state of trance the individual becomes outwardly as good as dead *ajāna* or warmth remaining as the only palpable indication that the person is alive. Certain visions dawn on consciousness as it passes from state to state from level to level and from plane to plane. The true vision is that which arouses the prospect of the goal. Certain *iddhis* or supernatural faculties also develop in the same process, but one is to beware of them so that they may not stand in the way. Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 168—170) speaks of five *jhānas*. With regard to *jhānas* five kinds of *asī* or mystery are obtained (1) the power of reflecting on the *phasic* thought (*saṃjāṇasī*) (2) the power of attainment (*samāpajāṇasī*)



## CHAPTER VII

### PUGGALA

(Individuality and Personality)

*Puggala*, *atta* *satta* and *jīva* are the four terms which occur in the Buddhist texts in connection with all discussions relating to individual individuality personality self and soul.<sup>1</sup> As a biological term, *puggala* is nowhere used to deny the existence of an individual being or a living person. When it is said e.g. in the *Dhammapaṭṭha* that the self is the lord of the self (*atta hi attano nātho*)<sup>2</sup> or in the *Vāṇapariṇibbāna Suttaṇṭa* 'Be yourself your own lamp and your own refuge' (*atta-dīpa iharatha attā-varaṇa*)<sup>3</sup> by the word *atta* or self is meant the living individual to whom the advice is given. Here the particular individuals or individuals are beings that exist in fact grow in time and ultimately die. Certain philosophical enquiries arise in connection with these individuals: the living souls (to use in English phraseology). The question arises how are the individuals known to us? How can that be represented in knowledge? And how far can the ultimate reality be reduced in thought or experience?

These points are popularly discussed in the *Vibhāṅga-sūtra* in the very opening discussion. We are told that the individuals are signified by some names arbitrarily fixed *Abhisena* *Sūrisena* or *Vīrasena*. The personal name is only a conventional device to denote an individual and to distinguish him from other individuals. It has no connotation beyond this symbolism. The name in itself is insufficient as a means of forming a complete idea of the individual concerned when we proceed to represent the individual in knowledge we only lay hold of certain perceptions or concepts denoting the various aspects or factors. But the individual concerned is not

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*Abhiṭṭhāna* I p. 20

*Attā* 116

*Attā* II p. 100



*Puggalavādin* in Buddhaghosa's commentary. As Dr. Barua points out, there is a good deal of misrepresentation of the opponent's view point, the main intention of the orthodox defender of the good faith being only to establish a verbal interpretation of a verbal proposition with a view to taking a dialectical advantage over it.<sup>1</sup> There is an attempt throughout to show that the *Puggalavādin*'s position is not different from that of outsiders who are avowedly the upholders of the doctrine of soul as a permanent entity. But reading between the lines, it is easy to make out clearly that wherever the suggestion is made that the import of the point under discussion is identical with the view point of the outsiders, it is at once repudiated. The controversy is important as bringing out the exact Buddhist position with regard to the problem of *Puggala* or Individuality. The position upheld on the whole by the unknown Buddhist opponent may be reduced to this, that to talk about the five aggregates as *Uppamāsa paññāti* is to return no answer to the problem of individuality. If five aggregates be real as concepts or means of representation, they convey no meaning without reference to individuals in existence. Without such a reference, the aggregates, posited as reals, are mere abstractions.

The problem of individuality is bound up with the problem of the ego-perceptant or internal knower (*vedagā*). The problem of the ego has been discussed in the *Viññāṇa*. The position of those who uphold the doctrine of the ego is stated thus: that there is an internal knower in every living cell or individual who is the real seer of all things seen, the hearer of all things heard and so on (*vedagā upalabbhā*).<sup>2</sup> The organs of sense stand as so many avenues through which the ego gathers experience of the external world. According to the Buddhist view as set forth in the *Viññāṇa*, the ego thus conceived does not satisfactorily account for the mental phenomena. If the tongue, the organ of taste, had not its local independence, the sweetness or bitterness of a thing could also have been tasted and discriminated even when the thing swallowed passes beyond the range of the tongue. The same holds true also in the case of other organs of sense. A scientific explanation of all

<sup>1</sup> *Introduction to a History of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Upanisads*, Introduction, p. 34.

mental phenomena does not lie in a single cause such as the ego but in a conjuncture of causal circumstances (*paṇṇa-samagga*). It is true no doubt that whenever any mental operation takes place, it takes place as a unit with regard to time depending on the same subjective basis and stimulated by the same object (*ekasmiṃśa kṛānamāsa*)<sup>1</sup>. The Buddhist formula is there must be the eye, the organ of sight then must be a visible matter (*viṣa*) present within the range of vision (*āpāthegata*) and there must be auditory cognition, the combination of the three making the sense-impact (*phassa*) possible this impact is a condition precedent of sensation. In searching for the ego which is believed to be the *asa* or substratum of individuality, we tumble only upon certain sensations or perceptions or cognitions or volitions or predispositions but never the substratum itself. The usual description of ego is that it is permanent, invariable, eternal firmly established like a wooden pillar of a city-gate and the same for ever (*āyato dāsa saṁsāra evaṇṇādivatthi*), *asaṁsaṁ vasaṁ (asaṁsa)* - But one can always appeal in vain to experience to turnish apodictic certainty for the existence of such an entity as within the living self. The Buddhist psychologist introduces mind as an internal sense or *sansa* *com-munus* (*manasāya*) but he is far from positing it as an ego but he admits the possibility of a state of consciousness when it has been free from all obsession of objects. In this state consciousness is *caṇ* in no way be characterized (*asaṁsaṁjja*)<sup>2</sup>. What happens to this consciousness after the death of the individual is not at all clear. But the Buddhist freely entertains the popular belief in rebirth. How can the process of rebirth be explained without the reality of the ego or soul is the question. This too has been discussed in the *Mūlaka*, as also in the *Kathāvatthu*. It goes without saying that the Buddhist thinker repudiates the notion of the passing of the ego from an embodiment to an embodiment. His is not a theory of transmigration of soul. The course of transmigration has been described in the *Eśasā-ṭṭasaka Upaniṣad* b. the simile of a grass-leech (*śraṇaṭṭaka*) which passes from the end of one blade of grass to that of another. The *Bhāṭa amāta* has sought to

<sup>1</sup> *Dhammapaṇṇa commentary* Vol. I pt. I p. 2

<sup>2</sup> *D.Ṭ.* I p. 14 *M.Ṭ.* I p. 136

<sup>3</sup> *M.Ṭ.* I 140

show that the analogy is untenable (*na yuktaṃ*). With the Buddhist rebirth is to be conceived as *kammassandaḥ* or the continuity of an impulse. The point is illustrated by the instance of a set of lamps, each with fitness for ignition and placed in a row and in close touch with each other, one of which being lighted, the others are lighted. Here there is no passing of any spirit from one lamp to another. The lamp which is first lighted serves only to help in producing the necessary condition for ignition in the remaining lamps.

## CHAPTER VIII

### PATICCA-SAMUPPĀDA

(*Dependent Origination*)

*Paticcasamuppāda* is claimed to be the fundamental concept of Buddhism as a system of thought. The term has been variously interpreted both by the Buddhist scholars themselves and modern scholars without sufficiently bringing out its philosophical import and implications. They have sought to explain it either as a doctrine of causation or that of dependent origination or that of becoming by the way of a cause by the usual and oft-recurring formula of twelve *Nidānas*. There are traditional expositions of the twelve *Nidānas* in many of the canonical texts and later literary stories both in Pāli and Sanskrit. There are several descriptions referring to *Paticcasamuppāda* as the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism. It is difficult to realise the metaphysical significance of this doctrine. It behoves us therefore to see if the discussion of the problem of *Paticcasamuppāda* can be introduced in a new way.

The formula of twelve *Nidānas* must be taken to be a later appendage to an earlier formulation of the doctrine. The formula came in only by way of an illustration of the original formulation which has been clearly set forth in the three Bodhi suttas in the *Uddāna*. Similar formulations are also met with in some of the suttas of the *Majjhima Nikāya*<sup>1</sup>. There is at least one sutta<sup>2</sup> in the *Majjhima Nikāya* in which the original formulation is presented without the illustrative formula of twelve *Nidānas*. The Bodhi suttas in the *Uddāna* clearly indicate three successive stages in the formulation of the doctrine: (1) *anuloma* or order of becoming, (2) *paṭiloma* or order of cessation (*nirodha*), (3) *anuloma paṭiloma* being a synthesis of the order of becoming and the order of cessation. There were certain Buddhist schools, including the *Sarvāstivādins* in whose opinion the *anuloma* order only is valid. It is therefore not sur-

<sup>1</sup> *Majjhima Nikāya* I pp. 262 foll.

<sup>2</sup> *Cāṇḍakakālāpīya sutta* *Majjhima Nikāya* II p. 32.





Thus having been that comes to be from the arising of this that arises. Thus having not been, that does not come to be from the cessation of this that ceases to be. This is illustrated by the oft-recurring formula of twelve *Nidānas*. The Buddhist schools have sought to explain the earlier form so as to make it fit in with the formula of twelve *Nidānas*. But the question remains — What is the correct interpretation of the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* as stated in the above form apart from any reference to the formula of twelve *Nidānas*? Does it imply a mere order or sequence of facts as experienced and noted or a fully developed doctrine of causation? So far as we can make out it is rather a natural basis of the doctrine of causation than the doctrine of causation itself. The sequence is nothing but an order in which snapshots of things are taken and noted down with the result that the facts as registered come as disconnected data of experience. In introducing a logical inter-connection between these facts we have recourse to a law of causation. The idea of sequence implies an antecedent (*purakkāra*) and a consequent (*pacchakkāra*). Explained in the light of causation the antecedent is not a single cause but a combination of certain circumstances with causal efficiency to account for the occurrence of the consequent. The causal circumstances when analysed and classified and differentiated yield the conception of a number of *paṇṇāsa* or rational modes of representing the nature of *dhammā* in thought. As for sequence as expressing the nature of reality as commonly experienced it is not something which mind imagines but something which forces itself on mind. This led some of the Buddhist schools to speak of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* as *asankhata-dhātu* or uncreated element.<sup>1</sup> The textual authority cited in support of this view is as follows — Whether monks there be an arising of *Tathāgatas* or whether there be no such arising in each this nature of things just stands this causal status this causal orderliness, the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the *Tathāgata* is fully enlightened that he fully understands. Fully enlightened, fully understanding he declares it teaches it reveals it sets it forth manifests explains, makes it plain saying 'Behold! conditioned by this, that comes to be'.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Kathāvatthū*, Vol II p. 319.

<sup>2</sup> *The Book of the Hundred Sayings*, Vol II p. 11.

The *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* rightly points out that the *Paṭicca-samuppāda* mode (*waya*) differs from the *Paṭthana* mode in this respect that it is just concerned with sequence in the procession of events or phenomena as observed (*tabbhaṇa tabbhaṇā*) while the *Paṭthana* mode is concerned with the differentiation of the various *paṇṇāsa*s or causal factors involved in the causal relation. The difference in view may perhaps be better expressed if we say that the *Paṭicca-samuppāda* mode is concerned with a dynamic view of the *Paṭthana* mode with a static view of nature or reality. Turning to the oft-recurring formula of twelve *Nidānas* we find that *avijjā* is generally allowed to head the list. The term is generally rendered as ignorance, which does not, however, bring out the philosophical connotation of the term. As regards *avijjā* Buddhaghosa has raised and discussed a very interesting point. Can *avijjā* as conceived in Buddhism be treated as an uncaused root-principle like the *mūlaprakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy? The Pāli scholar maintains no doubt in agreement with some of the earlier exponents of Buddhism, that *avijjā* is not conceived on the lines of Sāṅkhya *mūlaprakṛti*. With the Buddhists *avijjā* is not uncaused. Buddhaghosa has however to admit that there are some texts in which *avijjā* may appear to be similar to the *mūlaprakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya system. He refers in connection to a text in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* in which the Buddha is represented as saying "the beginning of *avijjā* does not appear so that one might say that ignorance did not exist formerly but it has since come into being. However it is apparent that *avijjā* is conditioned. The beginning of *bhava-taṅkā* does not appear so that one might say that *bhava-taṅkā* did not exist formerly but it has since come to being. However it is apparent that *bhava-taṅkā* is conditioned. Thus the Buddha sought to account for the cosmic process of the cycle of births and deaths by mentioning two specific conditions of actions.

The Pāli scholars ought to have considered along with it the other statement which occurs in the *Samvutta Nikāya* (*Anamata samvutta*). In the *Samvutta* text the Buddha is represented as saying "Incalculable (endless) is the process of *samsāra*, the beginning of beings running through the course of *samsāra* being cloaked by *avijjā* and tied to *bhava-taṅkā* does not appear"<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Samvutta Nikāya* II p. 186.

All this amounts to saying that endless is the cosmic process, the course of *samsāra* so that its beginning ever remains unknown and unknowable. Thus the entire history of *samsāra* may never be unveiled. But the *dhamma* of the process is definitely known. The *dhamma* in question consists in the related character of reality in its process of becoming. If one knows this *dhamma*, it is immaterial whether one has the historical knowledge of the entire course of *samsāra* or not. At whichever point one takes up its consideration it involves two factors, namely, *avijjā* and *bhava-taṇhā* that are sufficient to account for the happy or unhappy states of beings. *Avijjā* is that factor which keeps the nature of *dhamma* concealed and *bhava-taṇhā* is that factor which constitutes an incessant impulse to becoming. All forms of ignorance are expressions of *avijjā* and all kinds of desires are various manifestations of *bhava-taṇhā*. It is in this manner that Buddhism meets and answers agnosticism which draws a huge capital out of man's incapability to know the first beginning of the world.

It has been well pointed out by Rhys Davids that the doctrine of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* finds in the *Mahānīdāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (Vol II pp 55 foll) the fullest exposition accorded to it throughout the *Pitakas*. The *Dīghabhāṇakas* or the reciters of long discourse expounded the first two of the 12 *saṁsāra* or chapter, viz. *avijjā* (ignorance) and *saṁkhāra* (confections). In the *Paccayabara-vibhaṅga* of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* the formula is reiterated and analysed with greater variety of presentation. But in the *Mahānīdāna Sutta* the doctrinal contents are more fully worked out. Although the formula as expounded in this *sutta* ends in the usual way — such is the uprising of the whole body of ill — the burden of the dialogue is in no way directly concerned with ill, pain or sorrow. In certain other passages where the *saṁsāra* chain occurs, *dukkha* occupies the foreground (*Dialogue of the Buddha* II, p 42). *Saṁkhāra* is Sanskrit *Samsāra* which means an aggregation. *Avijjā* (ignorance) is the cause of aggregation. *Taṇhā* is also interpreted as thirst, craving. According to the *Cūḍavāsika Saṁkhaya Sutta*<sup>1</sup> a bhikkhu wins deliverance by the extirpation of cravings so as to become consummate in perfection in his union with peace and in the higher life and foremost among gods and men. Sensation

<sup>1</sup> *Majjhima Nikāya* 1: 151 foll.

is the cause of thirst. *Āvedā* means sensation or feeling which is pleasurable or painful. *Salayatana* is the six organs and objects of sense, viz., *Rūpa*, *Vedanā*, *Saññā*, *Sankhārā* and *Viññāna*.

*Viññāna* is consciousness which, according to the Buddha, runs on and continues without break of identity.<sup>1</sup> All sinful acts may be traced to *avijjā* or ignorance. All wrong states have their origin in ignorance.<sup>2</sup> It is clear that from contact arises feeling.<sup>3</sup>

According to the Buddha, the only ideal worth striving after, is the ideal of a perfect life in this present existence in sauntship and this ideal is to be reached by freedom from desire.<sup>4</sup>

In the *Nidāna Samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*<sup>5</sup> we find that the Buddha explained to the bhikkhus the chain of causation which begins with ignorance and ends with birth, old age and death leading to grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair. In the chain of causation we find that six senses originate from name and form. In the *Salayatana samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*<sup>6</sup> the Blessed One speaks of the six senses. He points out that the eye and the objects of sight, the ear and the sounds, the nose and the sense, the tongue and the savours, the body and the things tangible, the mind and the mind's state are all impermanent, all and void of the self. But there is the way of escape from these. This is the restraint of desire and lust which are in the eye, etc. Where there is no desire there is no ill. He further points out that by seeing the six senses as impermanent, as fetters and as *āsavas* ignorance is removed and knowledge arises, fetters are abandoned and *āsavas* (sins) are uprooted. The Buddha characterises the eye and the object of sight, the ear and the sounds, etc. as transitory. According to him passion is a disease and one can abide passionless by not imagining, 'I have an eye' etc. One should not be enamoured of the object cognisable by the eye, etc. If one is so then one is called restrained. If one is not so then one is said to have lack of restraint.<sup>7</sup> We find that from *phassa* or contact *vedanā* or feeling

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Mahāvagga-saṅgahīta suttā* M N I 250 foll.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Opamma Samyutta* S V II pp. 202—207.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Dhāra Samyutta* S N III pp. 140 foll.

<sup>4</sup> *Uddāna* chapter I.

<sup>5</sup> Pt. II pp. 1—33.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. IV pp. 201—204.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Salayatana Samyutta* S N Vol. IV pp. 1—204.

arises. In the *vedanā samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikaya*<sup>1</sup> we find that there are three *vedanā* or feelings — Feeling that is pleasant, feeling that is painful, and feeling that is neither pleasant nor painful. The lurking tendency to lust for pleasant feeling to repugnance for painful feeling and to ignorance of feeling that is neither pleasant nor painful must be abandoned. Pleasant feeling should be regarded as an ill, painful feeling as a barb and neutral feeling as impermanent. So all these should be abandoned. This abandonment in a bhikkhu is called rightly seeing.<sup>2</sup>

In the *Paccayakkosa Vibhanga* various *paccayas* are enumerated and explained after which the *vattanta* portion naturally closes. According to this *Vibhanga*, *avijjā* or ignorance means ignorance in suffering in the origin of suffering in the cessation of suffering and in the path leading to the cessation of suffering.

As regards confections or conformation, we find confections of merit, demerit, body, mind and speech. There is good thought in the domain of sensual pleasure and in the domain of form, conducive to charity and virtue. The reverse of it is found in *apassādiḍḍhivamsādhāra*, confections<sup>3</sup> regarding demerit. As regards consciousness it is consciousness as regards sight, hearing, scent, tongue, body and mind. There is name and there is form. The name consists of *vedanā* (feeling), *sāññā* (perception) and *samkhāra* (confections). The form consists of the element of four great beings.

As regards contact it is contact with regard to eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. There is sensation due to sight, due to hearing, due to smelling, due to taste, due to bodily action and thought. There is desire for form, sound, scent, taste, touch and *dhammā* or thing. There is attachment for sensual pleasure, false notion, etc. *Bhava* or existence is of two kinds — existence as a state of action and existence as a state of origination. As regards the existence as a state of action we may speak of the confection of merit and demerit, etc. and as regards the existence as a state of origination we may speak of the coming into being, form, formlessness, etc. Then as regards birth it means the existence of beings and the origination of *āśandhā* or the constituent elements. Then as regards old age and death there is infirmity of beings and the

<sup>1</sup> IV. 204—235.

CI. *Udāgāṇasamyutta* SN. IV. 204—235.

ripeness of *indriyas* or senses. Regarding death, it is nothing but disappearance of the human beings and the destruction of *skandhas* and life-senses.

Name and Form originate from consciousness and from Name originates ignorance. From sensation, desire, contact, attachment and ignorance originate. Name is nothing but an aggregate of sensation, perception and conception. Six senses originate from name and form, viz., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.

## CHAPTER IX

### KAMMAVĀDA

(*Doctrine of Karma*)

The Pāli term denoting the doctrine of *Karma* is *Kammaṇṇa* the alternative form of which is *Kammāda*.<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of *Karma* is accepted in all the main systems of Indian philosophy and religion as an article of faith. The Buddha is generally credited with the propounding of this doctrine but there is a clear statement in the *Majjhima Nikāya* to show that the doctrine had not originated with the Buddha. The statement is to the effect that the doctrine was propounded before the advent of the Buddha by an Indian teacher who was a householder.<sup>2</sup>

According to the popular Hindu belief *Karma* is a sum total of man's action in a previous birth determining his future destiny which is unalterable. Its effect remains until it is exhausted through suffering or enjoyment. This popular notion of *Karma* is exemplified by a birth-story called *Mataṅgabhaṭṭa Jātaka*.

The two extreme views of thought having a bearing upon the doctrine of *Karma* are stated thus in Buddhism. (1) *sabbam paṭhe bhataṭṭa* all that a being suffers from or experiences is due to the sum total of his deeds in the past. (2) *sabbam akataṭṭa appaccava* all that a being experiences in this life is only a matter of chance.

These two extremes are sought to be avoided in Buddhism. Jainism, which too claims to be a rightly formulated doctrine of action (*Āśrava*) is distinguished from fatalism or determinism on the one hand and the doctrine of chance on the other, takes up a position which is not acceptable to the Buddhists. Partly determined and partly not determined (*anāśrayata*) or partly due to external causes and partly due to oneself is taken to be the declared position of Jainism which has been severely criticised in the *Devadāsa sūtra*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Majjhima Nikāya* I p. 453.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 463.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* Vol. II pp. 214-215.





On the whole Buddhism shifted the emphasis to the action and state of the mind. Accordingly *Karma* came to be defined as *Cetana* or volition. A person can not be held morally or legally responsible for any action of his or her if it is not intentional. Thus the Buddhist teachers tried to define *Karma* on a rational and practical basis. This point of view has, however, been shortly criticised by the *Sātrahīnaga*<sup>1</sup>. In the system of the *Abhidharma* the Buddhist teachers seek to furnish the psychological data of ethics, men's conduct or external behaviour being regarded as an outward expression of his internal character. The accepted Buddhist idea of the doctrine of *Karma* may be represented by Buddhaghosa's expositions.

Buddhaghosa in his *Abhidhammā*<sup>2</sup> defines *Karma* as volition expressed in action (*Cetanāya bhikkhāva kammam tadame*). An action is no action until the will is manifested in conduct. *Kamma* means consciousness of good and bad, merit and demerit (*Kammam nāma kusalākusala-cetana*)<sup>3</sup>. *Kamma* is of four kinds: (1) *Ditthadhamma-vedaniya* i.e. *Kamma* which produces result in this life (2) *Upapaccavedaniya* i.e. *kamma* which produces result in the next life (3) *Aprāparyavēdanīya* i.e. *kamma* which produces result from time to time<sup>4</sup>, and (4) *ābhava-kamma* i.e. past *kamma*. We have another fourfold division of *kamma* — (1) *Gāhaka* i.e. an act be it good or bad which has a serious result (2) *Lokula*, i.e. excess of either virtue or vice which produces its respective results (3) *Āsanna* i.e. *karma* which is thought of at the time of death and (4) *Katattā-kamma* i.e. an act which has been frequently done by one in his life-time and which in the absence of the three previous *kammās* causes rebirth. We have still another classification of *kamma* (1) *Janaka* (determining the character of rebirth) (2) *Upatthambhaka*, (sustaining) (3) *Upapilaka* (oppressive) and (4) *Upaḥatana* (hurting). These twelve kinds of acts and consequences are manifested in their true aspect in the Buddhist knowledge of the consequences of *Karma*. Those who are endowed with the spiritual

<sup>1</sup> *Jayantī* II: 11, 12, 13, 14  
pp. 50, 51

<sup>2</sup> *Abhidhammā* II p. 614

<sup>3</sup> *Abhidhammā* II p. 601

insight come to know some *kammanāra* and *apakanāra* <sup>1</sup> *Kamma* produces consequence, retribution is born of action action is the cause of rebirth in this way the world continues No action passes from the past life to the present nor from the present to the future<sup>2</sup> Regarding the relationship between *kamma* and *vipāka* Buddhaghosa says that there is no *kamma* in *vipāka* and no *vipāka* in *kamma* Each of them by itself is void at the same time there is no *vipāka* Just as there is no lot in the Sun nor in the lens nor in the dried cow-dung and likewise fire is not outside them but comes into existence on account of their requesters in the same way *vipāka* is not seen within the *kamma* nor outside it A *kamma* is void of its *vipāka* which comes through *kamma* *Vipāka* comes into existence on account of *kamma* <sup>3</sup> In the past the *āharaṇā* which originated as the consequences of action (volition) ceased In this existence other *āharaṇā*s arise out of the consequences of past deeds There is no condition which has come to this existence from the past in this existence the *āharaṇā*s which are originated on account of the consequences of *kamma* are destroyed In another existence others will be produced from this existence not a single condition will pass on to the next existence <sup>4</sup> According to the *Ittharāṇi* *Kamma* is of three kinds *Ayakkamma*, *Paṭikkamma* and *Manokamma* It is *Cetana* and the states associated with it According to Childers all three originate in *cetana* He further points out that *kamma* under the name of *samkhāra* is one of the links of *Paccasamuppāda* <sup>5</sup> Buddhaghosa divides *kamma* into (1) *Kamma-samutthāna* (set up by *Kamma*) (2) *Kamma-paccaya* (caused by *Kamma*) (3) *Kamma-paccavavut-tasamutthāna* (caused by *Kamma* and set up by consciousness) (4) *Kamma-paccayādhāra-samutthāna* (caused by *Kamma* and set up by retention) (5) *Kamma-paccayastvasamutthāna* (caused by *Kamma* and set up by temperature) *Kamma* is ultimately reduced to the psychological factor of volition Volition is the unique determination of will Will exercise has its power over its co-existent mental properties and

<sup>1</sup> *Ittharāṇi* magga II p. 60.

<sup>2</sup> *Ittharāṇi* magga II p. 603.

<sup>3</sup> *Ittharāṇi* magga II p. 603.

<sup>4</sup> *Ittharāṇi* magga II p. 603.

<sup>5</sup> p. 176.

physical qualities. In fact all our activities in deed, word or thought are due to its influence. The doctrine of *Karma* or the efficacy of good or bad works is inseparably bound up with that of renewed existence. The world exists through *karma* and people live through *karma* (*kammāna vattati loko, kammānā vattati paṇā*)

## CHAPTER X

### DHAMMA

There is no other word or term in Buddhism which is of so frequent occurrence as *dhamma* or its Sanskrit equivalent *dharma*. This term, precisely as in the Vedic texts is used in both singular and plural forms. *Dhammatā* or *dhammā* is coined by the Buddhists as a special term to signify the essential nature of things, the normal condition, the usual course.<sup>1</sup> In actual usage, however, the distinction in meaning between *dharma* and *dhammā* is not strictly maintained. Mrs. Rhys Davids rightly points out that the word *dharma* has in the history of Buddhist thought undergone much elaboration, more so than in Brahmanism. Whether in its singular or plural form it occurs only ten times in the Three Vedas, it is given no special consideration, historical or other, in a standard work like Oldenberg's *Religion des Veda*.<sup>2</sup>

Childers suggests that the word in masculine or neuter form, conveys such meaning in English as nature, condition, quality, property, characteristic, function, practice, duty, object, thing, idea, phenomenon, doctrine, law, virtue, piety, justice, the law or truth of Buddha, the Buddhist scriptures, and religion. Similar is indeed the list of meanings suggested by Monier Williams in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary. The Pāli-English Dictionary compiled by Rhys Davids and Stede, gives a more methodical treatment of the word classifying the various meanings in which it is employed in Buddhism. But even here the treatment falls of its purpose inasmuch as it does not set forth the reason why and how the word came to comprehend such a wide range of meaning without any fear of contradiction or inconsistency on the part of those who used it. The *Dhammapadam-commentary* suggests that the word *dhamma* has been used in Pāli in one or other or all of these four meanings: (1)

<sup>1</sup> *Daśa Vādaḥ*, Vol. II, pp. 12, ff. *Dhammatā* and *dhammā* are etika *dhammā* and

<sup>2</sup> *Buddhism*, revised edn., p. 82.

guna (quality property characteristic) (2) *desanā* (discourse instruction) (3) *pariyāyā* (worded doctrine of Buddha scriptures) and (4) *nissatta-nijjāna-dhammā* (mental states, conditions or phenomena without involving the notion of ego or entity) <sup>1</sup> The utmost that we here have, is no definition but a bare statement or cataloguing of four different meanings in which the word or term has been employed in early Buddhism.

Some guidance is given by Mrs. Rhys Davids <sup>2</sup> and Professor Stcherbatsky <sup>3</sup> in the matter of understanding and appreciating the Buddhist conception of *dhamma* or *dharma*.

The definitions of the term *dhamma* or *dharma* as met with in the Buddhist and Brahminical works are all one-sided not to say far-fetched. We read for instance in the *Khuddakapāṭha-commentary* (p. 19)

*Maggaphalaṇṇānaṃ dhammo ti eke bhāṣitavaggeṇaṃ sacchakāṇṇānaṃ ca apāṭiṃ apāṇabhūṇaṃ dhāraṇaṃ paramassa-samādhānaṃ ca magga-araṇā ca itthamasmim attha dhammo ti anukāṇṇa-kāṇṇaṃ iggaṇasādhanaṃ itthaṃ c attha sādhanam vuttam kalam + yasaṃ bhikkhūc dhammā sammāhāṇā arāya atthangito maggo teṇaṃ aggaṃ abbhāvaṃ*

<sup>1</sup> According to some authorities *dhamma* means the efforting and fruition stages of the elect culminating in *nibbāna*. Our opinion, however, is that *dhamma* is that which up-holds (*dhāraṇa*) in the sense that those who have cultivated the path and realised *nibbāna* have no longer the fear of fall into the states of *wośa* and no less in the sense that it provides for the highest kind of *volunt* and ultimately transcends all need of effort. The teaching of the *iggaṇasādhanaṃ* proves the truth of this. Here it is said 'As many doctrines O Bhikkhus, have (so far) been formulated the Noble Eightfold Path appears to be the best of them'.

According to Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* (1. 1. 2) *Codanālakṣaṇo rīko dharmah*.

*Dharma* is that which is characterised by an urge into action fulfilling the (desired) object.

According to Manu's Code (Ed. Jolly, p. 14)

*Vidāddhikṣaṇaṃ vṛtataḥ sadbhāḥ nṛṇaṃ adarśadgūḥḥ*

<sup>1</sup> *Dhammapaṭṭha-commentary*, Vol. I, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Buddhism*, First and Revised Editions.

<sup>3</sup> *I H Q*, Vol. V, No. 4, pp. 737 foll.

*hrdavenābhyaṃgīkṛto yo dharmas tam nibodhata*

Comprehend that (alone) to be *dharmas* which is cultivated by the learned the elect the persons who are always free from hatred and passion and which is (at the same time) readily responded to by the heart

According to the consensus of opinion the Brahmanyāla definition of *dharmas* is

*Vanditah prātipādya itah dharmah*

*I śhatakrīṇvāsādhyo dharmah pūṃsām guṇo maitah*

*Prativeddhakrīvasādhyah sa guṇo dharmah ucyate*

'*Dharma* is an end to be attained in conformity with injunctions in the Vedas

*Dharma* is to be considered a distinctive quality of men to be achieved by means of action (work, conduct) as enjoined (in the Vedas)

Referring to Aśoka's use of the word Mrs Rhys Davids opines

The word *dharma* is not morality as it is unfortunately rendered in the *editio princeps*, nor is it 'law' or 'good form'. 'Smart's religion' is better but too ambiguous. F. W. Thomas' definition based on revelation and custom and a sphere of conduct leading to heaven is a better guide. But why the weighty the lofty term for that which ought to be done or not done namely 'conscience' is never used by translators is strange. Or if not conscience then at least, duty. Externally considered, *dharma* is, for India, law for Buddhism worded doctrine. As belonging to man's inner world conscience or duty is more fit. It is the urge of this sense that makes a man truly 'moral'. Because of that urge he (Aśoka) wards his fellowman in his person and in his interests.'<sup>1</sup>

In Varuna the Vedic ages arrived at the conception of an ordered universe where everything happens according to Law and nothing by the caprice of an arbitrary will. And in *śāstra* they reached the conception of rhythmical evolution or harmonious manifestation of the cosmos. Both of these conceptions constituted the historical or philosophical background of the later ideas of *satva* and *dharma*. In the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, I. 1 *śāstra* and *satva* are introduced as two aspects of one and the same idea or reality — *pratyakṣa-Brahman*. *Pratyakṣam Brahman sadasyam: śāstraṃ sadasyam: satvam sadasyam:*

<sup>1</sup> *Buddhism* revised edn. p. 2.8

In another passage of the same Upanisad I 9 *ṛta* and *satya* are mentioned along with *tapa*, *dama* and the rest as different items of one and the same system of conduct or duty.

*Rtam ca svādhyāyapramāṇaṇa ca Satyam ca svādhyāyapramāṇaṇa ca  
Tapaḥ ca svādhyāyapramāṇaṇa ca*

In a valedictory address in the same Upanisad I 11 we read

*Satyam veda Dharmam ca Svādhyāyaṁ nā pramadaḥ Satyaṁ  
na pramadiṣyām Dharmān na pramadiṣyām Kusalān na prama-  
diṣyām*

Speak the truth. Practise *dharma*. Do not neglect the study of the Veda. A right-minded man must not deviate from truth, from *dharma* and from good.<sup>1</sup>

Thus in the third passage where the word *ṛta* does not occur the word *dharma* is substituted for it. *dharma* takes the place of *ṛta*. What is the relation either between *ṛta* and *satya* or between *satya* and *dharma*?

We might suggest that *satya* is that which is in conformity with *ṛta*<sup>2</sup> and *ṛta* is that which is in conformity with *satya* and the same as to the relation between *satya* and *dharma*. Or we might say that *ṛta* assumes the name of *satya* when its nature is stated in terms of words, and that of *dharma* when its nature is manifested in the form of practice, duty or conduct. From one point of view, the whole programme of duty arises out of the primary idea of *ṛta* and from another point of view the whole programme of duty is comprehended by *dharma*. For the use of *dharma* in the sense of genus and species, whole and part, in the same breath we may cite here the Pāli gīthā.<sup>3</sup>

*Yasāc ca saturo dhammā uṇarinda yaṭhā tava  
Saccam dhammo dhuṭṭaṁ cāgo dūṭham so attheti*

He who is armed with these four *dharma* (principles) truth, purity, forbearance and self-sacrifice, overcomes the foe.

The relation between *satya* and *dharma*<sup>4</sup> as two aspects of one

<sup>1</sup> *dama* which is an antithesis to *satya* is that which is not in conformity with *ṛta*.

<sup>2</sup> *Uṇarinda Jāṭaka* (Pancholl No. 5.) Vol. I p. 260.

<sup>3</sup> For the juxtaposition of the two words *satya* and *dharma* or *dharma* and *satya* Cf. *Chāndogya Upanisad* VII 1.1 *dharmaṁ cādharmaṁ ca satyam cāritam ca dharma cādharma ca ādharmaṁ cādharmaṁ ca*



and the same idea or reality is emphatically brought out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I 4 14

*Satyam vaḥ tat / tasmā satyam vadanānām dhar dharmaṁ vadanti-  
tā dharmaṁ vā vadanānām satyam vadanti; etad dhyeyam abhayaṁ  
bhavati*

Dharma is indeed *satya*. Therefore they say that if a man declares *satya* he declares *dharma* and if he declares *dharma* he declares *satya*. Thus both are the same.

In this text *dharma* stands for 'law principle of justice sphere of conduct in conformity with established custom the disregard of, or departure from which is punishable by law'. For here we also read

*So iacche-rorūpam aivasṛjato-dharmaṁ Tadevat kṣatraya  
kṣatram Yad dharmaḥ tasmād dharmat paraṁ nāstyato abalīyam  
balīyām samūsamāsatā dharmena yathā rājās*

He created still further the most excellent Law (Dharma). Law is the *śvatra* (power) of the *śvatra*, therefore there is nothing higher than the Law. Therefore even a weak man rules a stronger with the help of the Law as with the help of a king.

The meaning of the all-important datum *dharmaḥ kṣatraya kṣatrah* requires some amount of elaboration. Here *śvatra* stands for both the earthly ruler and his divine prototype. When they say *dharma* is the *śvatra* of the *śvatra* they mean that *dharma* is the guiding principle of royal administration which is the same as to say the domination by the warrior-power has its justification or fulfilment only in the maintenance of the social order and the administration of justice. The king in his person is not above the law. It is the law that is above the king.

This conception of *dharma* was elaborated in early Buddhism. But with the Buddha the Buddhist *dharma* is no mere law but something more than law: it is the principle of righteousness in conformity with which a reigning king, is to shape his conduct and guide the course of administration.

*Ke paṇa bhāṇe raṭṭho rājā ti? Dhammo bhikkhū ti Bhagavā  
avoca. Idha bhikkhave rājā cakkaṇṭhī dhammiko dhammarāja dham-  
mam vena nussāya dhammam saṅkharonto dhammanā pariharonto  
dhammam apacāsamāno dhammaddhajo dhammaketo dhammadhi-  
pateyyo dhammakam rakkhavarasaguttiṃ samādhātā antojanas-*

nam *dharmasya amartyante* (<sup>2</sup> *amrta*) *balakṛtsamam brah-*  
*managahapatiḥ* *negamyanapadeu samanabrahmanu mupakṣ-*  
*ātan* <sup>1</sup>

Who is Venerable Sir the King of the king? Dharma O Bhikṣu is the King of the king and the Blessed One. Here O Bhikṣu it is depending on *dharma* (the law of truth and righteousness) honouring, respecting and revering it, doing homage to it, hallowing it being himself the standard-bearer of *dharma* the living symbol of *dharma* and acknowledging sovereignty of *dharma* that the king, overlord the virtuous and rightful monarch provides the right watch and rightful protection for his own people for the army, for the nobles for vassals for Brahmans and householders for town and country-dwellers for the religious and for beasts and birds.

It is characteristically observed by the translator of the *Chakravartīkhaṇḍa-sūtra* that the whole passage in the Pāli is a striking outburst on the superiority of right over might. <sup>2</sup>

That the above idea of *dharma* recognises the superiority of right over might is beyond all doubt. But the principle of righteousness is far more than the mere sense of right or that of duty. The above idea of *dharma* implies that there should not be any right or duty which is imposed from outside. An element of fatigue dissatisfaction or vexation of spirit is apt to be there when one is to function under such a pressure from without or such an obsession within. The idea of *dharma* is such that there should be the fulfilment of the whole duty of a man as man according to law, according to custom according to the sense of right, good and happiness but no feeling of tedium or dissatisfaction or vexation of spirit. The whole course of human duty to oneself one's people one's fellow-beings and one's fellow-creature is to flow spontaneously from within out of an inner urge or innate sense without causing vexation or exasperation of spirit. It is indeed such an idea of *dharma* as Asoka sought to inculcate in so many of his edicts and inscriptions.

*Dharma* is something to take one's stand on <sup>3</sup> something to

<sup>1</sup> In *patana* III pp 140-50 cf *Digha* III p 61

*Dialogues of the Buddha* pt III p 6, m 1

<sup>2</sup> Cf Asoka's R.E. IV *dharmamahi hatthi*



yakṣa is just a ratiocinative means establishing a harmonious link with that which is accepted as the final authority.<sup>1</sup> According to the traditional yakṣa of India *dharma* is not only that which is in accordance with the established custom or the accepted authority but also that which is lawful, judicious and equitable. *Raja paṭit-thaya dhammena samena rajam kṛoti* 'Having been established in sovereignty' he governed his kingdom according to law and equity. The same remarks hold true of the Pāli whom *dhamma-carivā sama-carivā* the practice of *dhamma* the practice of *sama* *dhamma* and *sama* being in conformity, harmony or consistency with each other.

With regard to the correspondence between *dharma* and *sīla* we may read in *Asoka's R. E. IV. dhammanāhi sīlanāhi tṛṣṭanto dhammam anussāsanti* taking their stand on *dharma* (principles of righteousness, law, piety and morality) and *sīla* (moral conduct) they will administer *dharma* impart instructions on it. Here *dharma* and *sīla* are to stand in conformity with each other. To say *dhammanāhi sīlanāhi tṛṣṭanto* is the same as to say *dhamma-thito* cf. *Mahāśāloṣṭha* (*Maṅgala Nikāya* II p. 74) *Mahāśāloṣṭha nama dhammaṃ dhammarāja dhamma-thito dhammam carati brahmanagahapātikeṇ nigamena cāra jñāpadeṇ ca upasathāhi ca upasathati*. This goes to show that *dharma* itself is the basis or foundation of both *dharma* and *sīla* that are to be fulfilled in practice.

Similarly when Buddha's system as a whole is intended to be meant the term *dharma* or *sāṃsa* is used and where it is intended to be represented in its two aspects, theoretical and practical we have the use of two terms *dharma* and *saṃsa* (Doctrine and Discipline) instead of one — the *dharma* *Imaṃvāso dhamma saṃsa* is the same expression as *Imaṃvāso dhamma* or *Imaṃvāso saṃsa*. As for the intended conformity or harmony between the two aspects of Buddha's system is formulated it is definitely enjoined in the *Dīgha Nīkāya* II pp. 123 foll.<sup>2</sup> that in establishing a right interpretation of Buddha's word one must test the soundness of the doctrine aspect in the light of the discipline and the soundness of the discipline aspect in the light of the doctrine. An interpretation failing to show that one is in conformity with the other must

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Neti pūjana* *vaṭṭakāya* pp. 21 foll.

Cf. *Neti pūjana* p. 21.

*Idaṃ paṭibhāṇanto sīla o'ṭṭhāsiṭṭhāṃ sīlaṃ sandassasiṭṭhāṃ dhammaṃ sīlaṃ upasāsiṭṭhāṃ dhammaṃ sīlaṃ upasāsiṭṭhāṃ* *Dhammapaṇṇa* *Paṭiccasamuppāda*.



enlightened, that he fully understands. Fully enlightened fully understanding he declares it teaches it reveals it sets it forth, manifests explains makes it plain, saying 'Behold.'<sup>2</sup>

*Tādaṃ va sū dātaṃ*. The element which is in itself in its own inherent right independently of all thought or interpretation. This is what is called *dharmaṃ taṃhā sūvata* or *paṇānadharmasūvata* (as in the *Laṅkāśāstra Sūtra*)<sup>3</sup>

According to Mr. Rhys Davids this involves the conception of a world-cosmos wherein cause and effect grinds its way, a cosmos rather than a theodicy, an infinite mechanism started none knows when, or how or to what end.<sup>4</sup>

On the same ground some of the early Buddhist schools of thought (the Pabbasādiya and the Māni-śvaka according to Buddhaghosa) declared *paṭicca-samuppāda* to be *asaṅkhata* uncreated by thought, the uncompounded while the exponent of Theravāda objected to the treatment of *paṭicca-samuppāda* as *asaṅkhata*. *Nibbāna* is *asaṅkhata* with the Theravāda as with the rest of the schools. Thus to regard *paṭicca-samuppāda* as *asaṅkhata* is to admit two *asaṅkhatas* which one could not reasonably do. The decision arrived at in the Mahāyāna system is that *Paṭicca-samuppāda* and *Nibbāna* are essentially one and the same reality. But is *paṭicca-samuppāda* dependent origination when taken in the sense of *paṇāna-dharmasūvata*? The term *pratityasamutpada* is employed evidently in this very sense in the opening verse of Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-kārikā*.

Dr. E. J. Thomas observes: Nāgārjuna begins by discussing the nature of causation as expressed in the theory of dependent origination (*pratityasamutpada*) of the causal formula. Dependent origination is said to be characterised by being (1) without creation (2) without origination (3) without cutting off (4) not eternal (5) not one (6) not differentiated (7) without coming, (8) without going. Its interpretation as a series of causes and effects is entirely rejected.<sup>5</sup>

With Dr. Barua 'Nāgārjuna's *pratityasamutpada* is the element

<sup>2</sup> *The Book of the Hundred Questions*, II, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Laṅkāśāstra Sūtra* edited by Nanjio.

<sup>4</sup> *Buddhism* by Mrs. Rhys Davids revised ed. p. 57.

<sup>5</sup> *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 119.

of reality<sup>1</sup> which is in itself in its own inherent right independently of all thought or interpretation. It is just a 'novelty' as intuited at each moment either in immediate continuity or at uniform intervals (*samānara samānānava*), that is to say a *dhama-paccupphanna dhamma*. The novelties are introduced as causally induced factors or even as links in a chain of dependent origination. It is thus in the sequence of novelties as noted that lies the ground of the theory of causation. The novelty is one thing the sequence another. The sequence from the view point of the observer is one thing the causal succession of antecedents and consequents from the viewpoint of the thinker — another. Upon the whole the element of reality is the ultimate point of reference of each thought without differentiation or characterisation.

The *dhammalaya* is to Hinayāna and generally to Hinayāna the body of doctrine, the doctrine taught by the Buddha. We read in the *Mahānāyaka*, p. 73

*Dhammahayana pana kho mahārāja sakkā Ekkama udavacetur dhammo hi mahārāja Ekkavasāṇa devalo* ;

It is possible O king to manifest the Master by the body of the doctrine. The doctrine is taught O king by the Master.

The *Dhammakāya* is to Mahāyāna the *dhamma* the *tathata* the *sāmāṇā* the *paṇāśadhammasikkatā* i.e. the element of reality in itself. In other words the *dhamma* or *dhammakāya* is the most essential point in all that is taught by the Buddha. Accordingly we read in the *Samyutta Nikāya* Vol II p. 267, Vol V, p. 407

*te sūtiṇaṁ Tathagata-dhammaṁ gambhīrā gambhīrattha lokuttara samākalapaṇṇatti*. These discourses that are uttered by the Tathāgata, are profound deep in meaning and concerned with *sūttata*.

*Sūttata* is just another term for *dhammata*, *tathatā*, *dhammatkattā*.

The *dhamma* which is to be beheld, before and all along thought, action or expression is significantly characterised as *pariṇā* (the most ancient) *sasāsa* or *sasāsaṇa* (eternal). The discovery of the nature of *dhamma* understood in this sense is compared by the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *I H O* Vol. X No. 4 p. 128 where Prof. Stcherbatsky observes: 'the *dhammas* are not things but elements of things. That the conception of *dhamma* is the basic conception of Buddhism is most clearly and pregnantly expressed by the Buddhists themselves in their old Credo — *yo dhammānuprabhavaḥ*'

Buddha to the discovery of an old buried and forgotten city. So we read in the Pāli *Nagara sūta* (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* II 105—106)

*Sevathapa bhikkhave puriso avarāṇaṃ carantīnaṃ passesiya  
purāṇam maggaṃ purāṇaṭṭhuraṃ pubbahehi manusshehi anurūḍhaṃ || so  
tam anugaccheyya tam anugacchantaṃ passesiya purāṇam nagaram  
purāṇam upadhamāṇaṃ pubbahehi manusshehi appharuṭṭhaṃ*

Just as if Brethren, a man firing through the forest through the great wood should see an ancient path an ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he should go along it and going along it he should see an ancient city an ancient prince's domain wherein dwelt men of former days.

Next in the *Dhammapada* *Yamaka-vagga*, Verse 5

*Na hi asena verasa sammantidha laddhaṇaṃ*

*Asena ca sammanti esa dhammo samantano*

Hatred does not cease by hatred. Enmity ceases by amity. This is the good old rule.

Thirdly, in *Asoka's M R E* (*Siddhipur*) *Esā'purāṇā pakati dighā-  
vase ca esa, Asam, esa kassī rye*

Such is the most ancient nature that which is of long standing thus indeed (in conformity with that) this should be done.

*H esa pi amhitaṣṭu yatharāham paṇḍitaṃ rye varisā' purāṇā pakati,  
yatharāham yatha nam aroham sīṇā* (*Yerragudi*)

The same should also be propounded as far as possible to the resident pupils according to the good old rule so that this (noble tradition) will remain unimpaired.

And fourthly, in the *Bhagavadgītā* XII V 27

*Sarvathava ca dharmasya sukhaścaśāntikaśva ca*

The Pāli expression corresponding to *Asoka's purāṇā pakati* is *purāṇā-pakati*. The *pakati* or *pakati* (Sk. *pakṛti*) is no other than another term for *dharma*. The *Soma-śānta-jātaka* (*Fau-bell* No 532) which embodies a teaching almost literally similar to that in *Asoka's Edicts* contains among others the following two gāthas setting forth the ancient or eternal nature of *dharma*

*Aśāmanyaṃ mahārāja purāṇam purāṇaparāṃ*

*Adhammaṃāṇi pūthetvā naraṃ so upapajjati*

*Ye ca dhammassa kṛtā purāṇassa dīpanāpatī*

*Uṇhīna ca sampanna na te gacchanti duggatīm*

<sup>1</sup> The text read and translated by B. M. Barua in *I II Q* Vol. VII pp 128-129



According to the first *gāthā* the *adhamatarī* is one who abandons one's respectful duty to one's elder brothers and others in accordance with the time-honoured tradition of household life.

According to the second *gāthā*, the virtuous man is he who effectually conforms to the ancient tradition — the established custom.

The gloss adds that here *dhamma* is the *paṇṇi-dhamma* the *dharma* which has held good by continued tradition — the precedent.

In dealing with the seven essential conditions of welfare of a nation (or of an order or institution) the Buddha definitely lays down

*Yamāhiṇaṃ ca appaṭṭhātam na paṭhipessanti, paṭṭhātam na sammucchādessanti yatha paṭṭhāte puṇaṃ dhamme catthassanti cūḍhi yeva paṭṭhankha no parihaṇi ti* (*Mahāparinibbāna sūtiyaṃ Dīgha II*)

So long the members of a nation (so of an order or institution) will not introduce that which is not established according to custom, will not destroy that which is established according to custom and will abide by the good old rule so long they may be expected to prosper and not to decline.

In explaining *puṇaṃ caṇṇi-dhamma* in this text Buddhaghosa speaks of a *paṇṇi pothaka* (Book of Precedents) among the Vṛys from which guidance was to be taken in deciding all cases (Vide B. C. Law's *Some Kāśmiri Tribes of Ancient India* p. 103 Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India* p. 22).

Thus it may be shown that *puṇaṃ* or *sandāna* is that which has held good for a long time that which has been adhered through many ages that which has therefore become a normal state of things, a normal course of life. The normal implies a norm (that which ought to be done or not done), as well as a normal state of the body, mind or morale of a person which enables him to respond to the norm and to abide by it.

The normal carries with the idea of universal, that which is or may be normally expected of all under a similar set of circumstances.

*‘abhiṅgaṃ peyheṃ manāpeheṃ manabbhāro jṛṇābhāro aññābhāro taṃ hut’ ittha labbha’* *’Imaṃ taṃ taṃ bhūṭaṃ sandāhataṃ paṭisādhānamāṃ taṃ paṇaṃ upaḷayjati, n etam itthanaṃ uṇṇati* <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Dīgha Nikāya* Vol. II p. 158





An attempt has recently been made to prove that the term *dharma* is so devised as to comprehend real realised and *reality* actual, actualised and *actuality*, phenomenon phenomenal and *phenomenality* matter material and *materiality* mind, mental and *mentality*, cause caused and *causality* law legal and *legality* thought, thinking and *thinkability* and the like, in short the entire universe of reality and appearance truth and opinion thought and expression principle and action in and through which all things and all individuals may realise their being feel their existence rise into recognition, move into action or proceed to perfection. That is to say, *dharma* is not only that which was is or shall be in itself in its inherent right or in its nature or characteristic form but that which comes to happen or prevail on account of its inherent force or intrinsic merit or value

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## NIRRĀNA

*Saṅkhaṇṇito Bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhako akaliko cripassiko  
npanavālo paccattam vedipabbo vāṭṭāṇi yad idam madanammadano  
piṇḍa-vaṇṇo ālayasamaggaho attapicchedo saṅkato atidullabho  
saṅkakkhavo saraso nirudho nibbānaṃ \**

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<sup>2</sup> *Admetus* upištā *Elizma* vācā. *Admetus* arām *admetas* abhāva, *ad* me *admetas* *admetas*.

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individual the rare attainment of the state of the void the waning out of desire the dispassionate state, the cessation of all sense of discordance the *nibbāna*.

To the very same effect the Buddha is represented in the *Irivya-pariyesana-sutta* as saying —

*Nibbānam pariyesamāro ajātam anattāram vopakkhamam nibbānam ajhagaman ajaram abyadhin amutam asokam asankhittam*

*Adhigato kho me aham dhammo sammāho daddāso duranubodho santo pavāto atakkhāvacaro nipuno pandita-cedenīvo* <sup>1</sup>

In seeking for salvation I reached in experience the *nibbāna* which is unborn unrivalled secure from attachment undecaying unailing undying unlamenting and unstained. This condition is indeed reached by me which is deep, difficult to see difficult to understand, tranquil excellent beyond the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be realized only by the wise (each individually for himself).

The *Uvacama-kāra* of the *Netti* which had served as a literary model for the Pāli lexicon *Abhidhānaṭṭhapaṭṭhaka* catalogue various words or terms uncritically called synonyms that bring out different aspects of *nirvāṇa* as conceived and described in early Buddhism. The *Netti-commentary* explains these terms as follows —

*Nirvāṇa* is called *asankhata* (uncompounded absolute) because it is not accounted for by any known causal factor (*na kamma paccayena sankhataṃ*), *ananta* (endless infinite) because it does not come to an end or knows no extermination (*nāsti cassa anto vinaso*), *avāsa* (stainless) because the influence of sin have no hold on it (*ārambham anavassamāto*), *satta* (true real) because it is not of a nature to be other than what it is (*aparivattabbā vāto*), *para* (the other shore), because it makes for the further shore of the ocean of existence through *samsāra* (*samvassasa paratrabhāvato*), *nipuna* (subtle) because it is accessible only to a subtle cognition as well as because it is in itself of a subtle nature (*nipunānāma-va-ajāta sukkhama-sukkhāvatā*), *saddhūsa* (very difficult to see) because it cannot be apprehended and except by the instrument of a gradually matured knowledge (*anupāśādanavambhārohi daddhūsa na sakkā*), *apajasa* (unimpaired) because it is not affected by any

<sup>1</sup> *Uvacama-kāra* I 107

<sup>2</sup> *Netti* p. 55

process of decay (*uppadajaraṇa anāyānāsa*), *dhūsa* (immutable) because it is in itself for ever (*cirabhavasa*) *apaloka* (not vanishing) because it does not disappear on account of decay and death (*jaramaramaṇi apalajjaraṇi*) *anidassana* (invisible) because it is not perceptible to the eye common or divine (*manvacakkhūna dīḍha-cakkhūna ca aparivattabba*) *apapaṭṭa* (not subject to ramification) because of the absence of the ramifying action of passions (*āga-dipapaṭṭicakkhūna*) *saṁsa* (tranquil) because of the total stoppage of the mischievous actions of sin (*akāra-cakkhūnāna āpasama-ketaya*) *amata* (undying) because it is of an immortal nature and it is not liable to disruption (*amataketutaya bhavābhavena*) *paṇṇa* (excellent) because it is of a supreme kind and it is self-sufficient (*ottamāṭṭhena anappanāṭṭhena ca*) *aya* (safe) because there is no effect on it of baneful consequences of sinful deeds (*avāṇaṇa kammakāra-apahavattitāna abhāna*) *khema* (secure) because it is secure from the four fetters (*saṁhi rāgā āsavadda abhāna*), *tanhakkhaya* (attenuation of desire) because desire is attenuated to nil therein (*tanhā kkhaya āṭṭha*) *acchariya* (wonderful) because it is rare to be seen even by those who are valuers (*katapāṭṭha pa-kāsaṇa ca pavatibbatta*) *abbhāna* (marvellous) because it is unprecedented (*abbhūtapavattita*) *anāṭṭa* (unimpeded) because there is no obstacle in its way (*anāṭṭavāṭṭa*) *anāḍaḍḍhamā* (not risky) because it is not of a nature to run any risk (*anāṭṭavāṭṭatā*) *ajāta* (unborn) because it is not subject to birth (*anibbatti-vāḍḍhāna*) *abhāṭa* (not subject to becoming) *upāḍaḍḍhā* *anupāḍa* (undisturbed) because it is not troubled by any disturbing factor (*ānāṭṭa anupāḍatatta*) *akāsa* (unlimited) because it is not manipulated by any known cause (*paṭisaṇṇa paravāsa kasaṇa*) *asaḍa* (undamenting) because there is no sorrow in it (*saṭṭhi āṭṭha saḍa*), *avāsa* (sorrowless) because there is no cause for sorrow (*avāsaṭṭhāna*) *anupasaṇṇa* (uncomplicated) because it is not complicated by any complication (*ānāṭṭa anupasaṇṇatā*) *anupasaṇṇadhamma* (not of a nature to suffer from any complication), *gambhīra* (deep) because it is only within the reach of profound intuition (*gambhīraṇa-gocarato*) *duppasaṇṇa* (difficult of perception) because it is difficult to perceive difficult to obtain without the right path (*anāṭṭapāṭṭiṇaṇa paṭṭiṇaṇa paṭṭiṇaṇa asāḍhameyyatā*) *uttara* (transcendental) because it lies beyond the whole of the mundane world (*sabbalokaṇa*





of *śaraṇa* or in distinguishing the same from the Jaina or the Brahmanical conception. The only sure and scientific way of attacking the problem of *śaraṇa* would be to consider it from the different points of view. Our approaches to the subject should not only be logical and mystical,<sup>1</sup> but also historical, eschatological, practical or popular psychoethical.

*Historical Aspect* — The wide popularity of *śaraṇa* as a distinct term of Indian religious thought is undoubtedly due to the greatest importance attached to it in early Buddhism by the Buddha, his immediate disciples and his later followers. It is somewhat astonishing that the term occurs nowhere in any of the Vedic or Brahmanical texts that may be definitely assigned to pre-Buddhist dates. An exception is sought, of course, to be made in favour of Pāṇini's *Aśādhavāṇī* accounting grammatically or etymologically for the formation of the word *śaraṇa* by the aphoristic rule *Nirāśaravate* (b. 2.50). Pāṇini's date, if it is at all earlier, cannot be far removed from that of the rise of Buddhism. Secondly, it is yet to be ascertained if this particular aphorism belonged actually to Pāṇini's own organon. Even if it did belong, it is still to be seen whether with Pāṇini the word *śaraṇa* was any more than a popular expression. In popular usage the word *śaraṇa* was employed either in connection with a burning fire, or in connection with a burning lamp, and in both cases it meant nothing but extinction. *pariśāṇa* as *śaraṇam* (*Dīgha* II, p. 157) like the extinction of a burning fire or lamp *nibbāna* *dhīra* *vekkhavaṃ padāpo* (*Suttanipāṭa* and *Akudasa-kappaṭha* *Ratana* *sūtra* V. 24), the wise person is just in the same way as this burning lamp extinguishes *nibbāna* *gati* (*Suttanipāṭa* *Dhammapadam*, V. 2), the fire has been extinguished *nibbāna* standing in contrast to *āhita* meaning properly kept up *parato* *aggi* *nibbā* *vereva* *evama* *me* *parato* *aggi* *nibbāna* (*Maṃḍana* I. 457), if this fire before me were to extinguish, if this fire before me were extinguished.

As regards Jaina literature the term *śaraṇa* is met with in the texts of the Ājama, — such authoritative texts as the *Āśvaśāstra*, the *Sāṃkhyaśāstra*, the *Uttarādhikāraṇa* and the rest. But the Jaina

<sup>1</sup> It is mainly from the logical and mystical points of view that Dr. B. M. W. has considered the question of *śaraṇa* in his Bombay lecture *Philosophical Aspects of Buddhism*.



maññati nibbāna-mimi na maññati nibbānaṃ na maññati nib-  
bānaṃ me hi na maññati nibbānaṃ nibbānaṃduta (M N I p 6)

This may be taken to suggest two different modes of thinking, one the Brahmanist mode by which was developed the idea of *Brahmanuṣṇa* and the other, the Buddhist mode, by which was developed the Buddhist idea of *anatta*. With the Brahmanist of all ages *anatta* is *Brahma-śirodāsa* whether Brahman is saguna or nirguna. That is to say, with the Brahmanist thinker precisely as with the Juna the problem of *anatta* is approached from the point of view of *ātman* whilst with the Buddha or Buddhist thinker the approach is from the view-point of *anatta*.<sup>1</sup>

*Eschatological Aspect* — The belief already gained ground among the people of India at the time of the rise of Buddhism that true salvation of man consists in evolving into an eternal personality exhausting all possibilities of rebirth — of reappearing in the mother's womb as they would put it.<sup>2</sup> The whole chain of reasoning is: To be subject to birth is to be subject to decay and death. The world of life is so ordained that there is no escape from decay and death for one who has been brought into existence by the natural process of creation — by the parental union in the case of all higher forms of earthly beings.<sup>3</sup> The very possibility of such an escape is denied by the daily experience of things or events happening around and at all times.<sup>4</sup> Even a *Buddha* or *Isakaputa* cannot escape it in spite of his universally admitted and unrivalled greatness and perfection.<sup>5</sup> And *Samsara* for an individual is nothing in

<sup>1</sup> Vide *Lanka sūtra sūtra*

<sup>2</sup> *Majjhima-sūtra* *Akuddakapāṭha* and *Sattasampajāna* na hi jātā sambhavaṃ viyaṃ paṇaṃ eti

<sup>3</sup> *Majjhima* I p 200 *Idha māṇusūtaṃ na sammapaṇāḍhaṃ haṃti māṇuḥ ca māṇuḥ haṃti jantukāro ca paṇaṃ upaṇṇāḍhaṃ haṃti* *naṃ haṃti sammapaṇāḍhaṃ sambhavaṃ haṃti*

<sup>4</sup> *Majjhima-sūtra* *Sattasampajāna* *Duḥkha* II p 158 *naṃ tvaṃ jātum bhūtaṃ taṃ haṃti paṇaḍḍhaṃ haṃti* *naṃ paṇaḍḍhaṃ tvaṃ haṃti* *naṃ paṇaḍḍhaṃ tvaṃ haṃti*

CI The *Mohamudgala* a 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

*Yā aj janamaṃ tīṇaṃ maraṇaṃ*

*ta aj janamaṃ jātavaṃ maraṇaṃ*

<sup>5</sup> So *Brahmā Sahampati* declares (*Duḥkha* II p 157)

*Sabbāṃ nibbānaṃ bhūtaṃ tvaṃ sammāraṇaṃ*

*yathā sabbāṃ Saṃkhāraṃ taṃ appaṭipuggalaṃ*

common parlance but the painful necessity of undergoing the repeated process of birth and death — of passing through the cycles of birth and death running in the course of transmigration of soul <sup>1</sup> or finding somehow the concatenation of individual existence through the repeated natural process of birth and death.

It is the consciousness of the contingent character of *samsāra* the world of life and existence and the bitter experience of its unpleasantness or unsatisfactory sequel that is at the back of the religious quest of a permanent ground of existence and experience — a permanent feature or element of reality some sort of an Absolute. So Buddha is represented as saying: Having been myself subject to the contingency of birth and experienced its unpleasantness I sought for *Nirvāṇa* which is without such contingency — which is unsurpassed and secure from all worldly joke and obtained it. Subject to the contingency of decay the contingency of disease, death sorrow and sin I sought for *Nirvāṇa* which is without such and such contingency<sup>2</sup> — which is unsurpassed and secure from all worldly joke and obtained it. The knowledge with the vision arose. Sure is my final emancipation, this is the last birth there is no longer the possibility of rebirth. Then this thought occurred to me: I have reached this element of things which is deep difficult to see difficult to understand tranquil excellent not within the words of mere logic, subtle and to be experienced only by the wise each for himself. The multitudes find delight in the home they are attached to the home and rejoice over it. It is difficult indeed for them to apprehend this position (of *samsāra*) namely the causal determination of all occurrences in fact, — of all becoming — to apprehend also this position (of *Nirvāṇa*) namely that it is the subsidence of all predisposition towards the form of creation the relinquishment of all ideas of belongings, the extinction of desire the dispassion the cessation the ultimate <sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Even the Buddha himself is recorded as saying (*Mayhima* I p. 82)

*Itam āko paṇo c'evaṃ jantaṃ vevidha mahallāṃ Boddhagataṃ aro anuppattiṃ  
antāro me evaṃ vattāti*

<sup>2</sup> The idea is Brahmanical as well as Jaina.

<sup>3</sup> The Buddhistic way of expressing it.

<sup>4</sup> *Mayhima* I p. 10. So āko aham atthāṃ j'ānāhamo sammā j'ānāham me  
dhammam vevidāṃ apāram anuttaram; jughakkā me; nibbānam parināmanā





they live they live *enjoying*, the bliss of peace obtained without having to pay any price for it.<sup>1</sup>

Such is in short the Buddhist description of *parinirvāṇa* which is the natural end of life of those gifted men who realize *nirvāṇa* in their present conscious existence (*dīṭṭa eva dhamma*).<sup>2</sup>

With the Jaina too, *parinirvāṇa* is the last fruit or final consummation of the highest perfection attained by a man or attainable in human life.<sup>3</sup> But with him *parinirvāṇa* is the same term as *nirvāṇa*<sup>4</sup> or *mokṣa* meaning final liberation that comes to pass on the complete waning out or exhaustion of the accumulated strength or force of *karma*.

With the Jaina however *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa* is not a dreadful or terrible term like the Buddhist *parinirvāṇa* which suggests at once an idea of the complete annihilation of individuality of a saint after death by the simile of the total extinction of a burning lamp on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick. So the point is discussed in the Jaina *Āśvaśāṇḍikā*: 'Would you really think (with the Buddhist) that *nirvāṇa* is a process of extinction of human soul which is comparable to the process of extinction of a burning lamp (on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick)?' - The hearer is advised not to think like that. For with the Jaina *nirvāṇa* is nothing but a highly

<sup>1</sup> *Ididdhā sukhā nibbāṇam bhūṭjanānaṃ* (ibid. p. 4)

<sup>2</sup> Cf.  
*Piṭṭu vathā nirvāṇamabhāvapāto*  
*anāpādanā , anāhāri nāmanā* || *am*  
*disam na bhikkhū vidhāya na bhikkhū*  
*anekakāraṇā* / *...dhamma* / *ānāpāna*  
*piṭṭu vathā na nirvāṇamabhāvapāto*  
*anāpādanā , anāhāri nāmanā* || *am*  
*Disam na bhikkhū vidhāya na bhikkhū*  
*Ānāpānaṇā* / *...dhamma* / *ānāpāna*

(*Sau dāraṇanda bhāṣya*)

<sup>3</sup> *Kaṭṭhācārī* (Jacobi's edition) 120. *Tasmā naṃ anāpādanā nāmanā nāmanā*  
*anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā* *ānāpāna* *nāmanā* *anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā*  
*anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā* *ānāpāna* *nāmanā* *anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā*  
*anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā* *ānāpāna* *nāmanā* *anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā*  
*anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā* *ānāpāna* *nāmanā* *anāpādanā* *anāhāri nāmanā*

<sup>4</sup> *Kaṭṭhācārī* 120. *Tasmā naṃ anāpādanā nāmanā nāmanā* - *Fah parinirvāṇa bhāṣya*

<sup>5</sup> *Manuṣyaḥ kṛmā dāyava eva nāpādanā nāmanā nāmanā* quoted in the 4th *āśvaśāṇḍikā* *ānāpāna* sub voce *ānāpāna*

special or transcendental condition of human soul, in which it remains eternally and absolutely free from passion hatred birth decay disease and the like because of the complete waning out of all causes of *dukkha*.<sup>1</sup>

The *Vibhūṭipāṭha* definitely says that after the attainment of *parinirvāṇa* the Buddha is no longer in that condition in which he is able to receive any offering made in his honour, though the offering itself as an act of worship is not fruitless on that account so far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus the Buddhist description of Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* leaves no room for the popular belief in the possibility of resurrection of the bodily form or even the spiritual form of a saint.<sup>2</sup> Is it, nevertheless, a complete cessation of personality, even if that personality is made up of pure consciousness? According to the *Lokāśāstara-Sūtra* there is then *lakṣaṇa-nirodha* (cessation of all signs of manifestation) but no *prabandha-nirodha* (cessation of process of *saṃskāra* in its own pure or transcendental mode).<sup>3</sup>

In all stages of evolution of religious thought in India the description of the ultimate goal of the higher path of religious effort carried with it the dread of extinction of the individual after death. In the opinion of such ancient law-givers as Baudhāyana and Āpastamba the *devas* leading the traveller by an onward journey to the pure realm of infinity beyond the solar region led finally but to the funeral ground *śmaśāna* and those who travel by that path alone, in disregard of *pitṛyana* become ultimately dust and perish (*yojo bhūṭā dhāmanate*).<sup>4</sup>

Rṣi Yājñavalkya's statement of the fate of the soul after man's death caused puzzlement to the simple minded Maitreyi. Verily I say unto thee the soul is complete in itself within and without. As a mass of intelligence (or consciousness) it emerges out of those (five) elements and loses its form of manifestation with their dis-

<sup>1</sup> *Sato e dhammā anāpāraṇiye bhāvaṃ āvāheṃ āhāsiṃ* (Bhāṭṭa's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*). *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, *anvayavivṛiti*, *śāśvatā* *śāśvatā* *śāśvatā* *śāśvatā* *śāśvatā*.

Note the description of emergence of an effulgent miniature form of the sage Śarabha, a out of burning fire by birth he offered himself as an oblation. (See *Samhitā* *Śarabha* *Śarabha* *Śarabha* *Śarabha* *Śarabha*).

<sup>2</sup> (See *Lokāśāstara-Sūtra* (Nagpo's edition)).

<sup>3</sup> Barua, *History of pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, pp. 47-49.







Disciples and all followers and worshippers find their place. No birth, no death. No sorrow, no lamentation. A ceaseless scene of peaceful worship and religious conversation in the midst of the very best of natural surroundings. A full heart and a serene mind in a world of plenty.

The same process of poetry and myth continued to produce at last the Sanskrit *Sukhāvastavaśāha* १ *Mahāvāna* work giving a highly romantic or imaginative description of a Buddhist Paradise: the realm of Amitābha १ Amṭaprabhā. The *sukhāvastā* is the infinite world of light, brilliance and effulgence. The Amṭābha १ as it may be easily perceived is no other than the Buddha in his infinite glory after his demise — the *mahāparinirvāṇa*.

A similar poetic imagery about *samsāra* enters in the metaphorical expression *samsārasagara* or *saṃsārasaṃdya* which is met with in Buddhist works १ *śālistambasūtra* and some of the later Jaina works.

*Logical Aspect* — If it be assumed that *samsāra* as commonly understood is something which has the contingency of birth, development and death (*jata bhūta mata*) the inquiry may pertinently arise if there is something else which has no such contingency (*ajata abhūta amata*). This inquiry was once pressed by certain inquirers among Buddha's immediate disciples. When the issue was thus pressed Buddha gave a reply the tenor of which went to convince the inquirers that they simply begged the question in pressing such an inquiry. The argument indeed was: The very fact that you have been striving after that something else which is without such contingency is sufficient to prove that you have been tacitly all believers in its possibility and were you not tacitly believers in its possibility you would not have cared to strive after it.<sup>1</sup>

According to Nāgārjuna *Samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* are two relative ideas, and as such there can be difference but no absolute distinction between the two (*samsārasya ca nirvāṇasya na hi kenācid āśrita*). If the significance of one term is dependent on the significance of the other both stand on the same footing in respect of each other. There cannot be any conception of a relation between the two even in apposition if there be not a common point of reference which is without differentiation or characterization and from which

<sup>1</sup> *U. Asia* pp. 51—52.



universality) is in itself inadequate to comprehend the whole of reality which is constituted not only of cognition but also of volition and feeling, to comprehend all of which yet another category is required, and it is *Nirvāṇa* (the Ideal, Ideality). It is not an experience that one may identify oneself with it or think that either one is *Nirvāṇa* or one is in *Nirvāṇa*, or one is from *Nirvāṇa*, or *Nirvāṇa* is one's own.<sup>1</sup>

*Psychical Aspect* — Here psychical is just another term for mystical. The mystic as distinguished from *saddhūsimānā* (devotee) or *paññāsimānā* (intellectualist), aspires to be a *Kaya-sakkhi*<sup>2</sup> or personal witness to to be face to face with to have a direct perception of, to come in immediate contact with in short to realize *nirvāṇa* by himself and for himself. It is after such realization that he begins to utter the joy of self-expression (*saddhāya udānethi*), to give an expression to self-mastery (*sāṃā*) and to teach the way of realizing *nirvāṇa* to others (*sabbānāṃ sacchikaroti paṭivedhi*). With him *nirvāṇa* is at once a vision, an experience, a feeling and a self-state — the highest, the best, the most real of all that he knows of, thinks of, or speaks of. As an element of experience it is inalienable, because the way is to experience each in himself by himself and for himself (*paracattam aṇṇānāṃ sadatābham*) it cannot be communicated to others, because its nature as experienced by each individual is indescribable in words. The message or personal testimony must be worthy of trust, the individual bearing it must be in a perfectly sound condition of body, mind, intellect and spirit. The vision of *nirvāṇa* dawns upon consciousness, the realization of *nirvāṇa* is possible in that stage of *samādhi* (trance, self-concentration) which is aptly called *saññānāḍaḍḍhanirōdha*. According to Buddha's claim, this is the ninth stage of *samādhi* reached for the first time by him, one step ahead of eight *samāpattis* (attunements, first stages of *samādhi*) mastered by other contemplatives in India already before his advent.<sup>3</sup> The *Satipatthāna* is the well-tried grammar to be followed by the aspirant in assuredly reaching and mastering all the nine stages of *samādhi*, the ninth being truly

<sup>1</sup> *Magghima* I, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> See for the explanation of these terms, LARSEN, Faith in Buddhism, in B. C. LAW'S *Buddhism in India*, pp. 326—340.

<sup>3</sup> *Aruparāga*, see *Sutta Magghima* I, pp. 103—6.



method of realization of *animesa* necessarily involves a process of perfect self-examination, self-purification, self-restraint and self-culture. If the experience of *animesa* consists in the feeling of peacefulness, tranquillity or harmony in the whole of one's being and in the whole of nature by which one is surrounded, it is not possible without the practice of self-alienation from all that is not one's own. Thus the process of a self-alienation involves a method of viewing things as they are (*yathābhūtaṃ bhūtaṃ bhūtaṃ tathā tathā*). From one point of view, the twofold ethical end of Buddhism is negative: (1) to keep off the hindrances (*nivaraṇas*) and (2) to put away the fetters (*samyojanas*) or to destroy the *asavas* (the sinfulness that lies deep in our nature). From another point of view, the end is positive, namely, to attain a perfect healthy condition of self. The rough scheme of self-culture through purity is set forth in the *Pañcavaliyaṇṇa* (*Majjhima*, I pp. 147—8) and it includes the following main items for consideration:—

*Sīla-suddhi*: Purity of conduct, purity of behaviour, purity of livelihood, purity of motive, purity of morals, purity of character.

*Citta-suddhi*: Purity of mind, purity of all things, mental purity, of mental attitude, purity of mental vision, purity of mental development, etc.

*Dittha-suddhi*: Purity of faith, purity of thought, purity of intellect.

*Kaṅkhaṇāpāna-suddhi*: Purity of faith by the removal of doubt.

*Maggamaggañānadassana-suddhi*: Purity of the path by the true understanding of what is and what is not the path.

*Paṭipadāñānadassana-suddhi*: Purity of the intellectual perception of the true path.

*Nānadassana-suddhi*: Purity of knowledge and insight.

The main items are really three: *Sīla-suddhi* (Purity of morals), *Citta-suddhi* (Purity of mind) and *Paññā-suddhi* (Purity of knowledge).

The rough sketch of the Buddhist system of Purity was developed by Buddhadatta in his *Abhidhammābhāṣana* and more fully by Upatissa in his *Pañcavaliyaṇṇa*. The final development of the system took place in Buddhaghosa's *Pañcavaliyaṇṇa*. There is no other





matchless island which possesses nothing grasps it nothing and which is the destroyer of decay and death (pp 211—12) <sup>1</sup> The world is bound by pleasure and by leaving desire *Nirvana* can be attained (*Ibid* pp 214—215)

According to the *Aśāscitta Jātaka* (II Cowell p 17) one who possesses strong will cherishes all good things to the Refuge and follows the path leading to *Nirvana*, is capable of destroying all ties by slow degrees. The *Mosa Jātaka* (Cowell II, p 26) describes *Nirvana* as the only everlasting thing, and says that all other things being composite in their nature are unsubstantial transient and subject to living and death. The *Gandāyudu Jātaka* (Cowell V p 55) says that zeal is the way to *Nirvana*.

According to the *Visuddhimagga* (V ol II, p 612) *Nirvana* is the extinction of the five *Ākāṅkṣas* <sup>2</sup> The attributes of *Nirvana* consist of absence of passion destruction of pride, getting rid of thirst freedom from attachment and destruction of all sensual pleasures. It is the cessation of all sufferings. It can be attained through meditation wisdom precept steadfastness and the rest.

According to the *Aṭṭhasaṅgī* (p 409), *Nirvana* means that from which the arrow of desire is gone away (*saṅkha saṅkhātam añam aṅgaṭam añ tasmā vāraṇa nibbānam*). It is freedom from all sins and final release from lower nature.

In the *Sonangalānāṇṇī* (I 217) Buddhaghosa says that a person obtains *Nirvana* by making himself free from the wilderness of misdeeds. It is described here as the state of bliss.

In the *Katha-saṭṭhapakarana aṭṭhakathā* (p 176) *Nirvana* is described as a void <sup>3</sup>.

According to the *Abhidhammatthasāṅgā* *Nirvana* is so called because it is a departure from that craving which is called *vāsa* lusting or craving. It is to be realized through knowledge belonging to the four paths. It is the object of those paths and their fruition. It is supramundane or transcendental (*lokuttara*). It is excellent uncreated, and free from lust.

According to Nāgārjuna's view in the *Mūlāla* an *Arjya aśaka*

<sup>1</sup> *Aśāscittam saṅkhātam añam aṅgaṭam añ tasmā vāraṇa nibbānam añ sam brahmā parināma aparāṇaṇi*

<sup>2</sup> *Pañcannam Ākāṅkṣānam aroko* (*Visuddhimagga II p 611*)

<sup>3</sup> *Nibbāna-saṅkhātaṇṇa Sūratāya*

does not take pleasure in the senses and their objects. Inasmuch as he does not find delight in them, in him craving ceases and by the cessation of craving (*tṛṣṇā*) grasping (*upādāna*) ceases, and by the cessation of grasping, becoming (*bhava*) ceases, and when becoming has ceased birth ceases, and with its cessation, birth, old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair cease to exist. In this sense cessation is *Nirvāṇa*.

Just as those whose hands and feet have not been cut off know how sad a thing it is to have them cut off by hearing the sounds of the lamentation of those whose hands and feet have been cut off, even so it is by hearing the pleasing words of those who have seen *Nirvāṇa* that they know how happy a state it is.

*Nirvāṇa* being uncaused, there is a cause that will bring about the realization of *Nirvāṇa*, but there is no cause that will bring about *Nirvāṇa* itself. A man by his ordinary power can go up from a certain place to the Himalayas, the king of mountains, but he cannot bring the Himalayas to his place. Such is the case with *Nirvāṇa*. Further *Nirvāṇa* is uncomposed, not made of anything, yet it exists. It is perceptible to the mind. By means of his pure heart, refined and straight, free from the obstacles, free from low cravings, the disciple of the Noble One can realize *Nirvāṇa*. Just as wind exists though it cannot be shown by its colour or its form, whether as thin or thick, or short or long, even so *Nirvāṇa* exists, though it cannot be shown in colour or in form.

The supposed purity of infant mind is no comparison for the purity of consciousness in *Nirvāṇa*. The mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, mean, small, slight, obscure and dull, whereas the condition of *Nirvāṇa* is transcendental, important, weighty, wide-reaching and extensive. The infant with imperfect mind is unable to grasp an idea so great.

*Nirvāṇa* is all bliss though the process seeking after it is painful. It is bliss unalloyed. When it is suggested that *Nirvāṇa* is painful, it is simply meant that the process of seeking after *Nirvāṇa* is painful, while *Nirvāṇa* itself is bliss, pure and simple, and there is no pain mixed with it.

Just as it is impossible to tell the measure of the water in the sea or the number of creatures dwelling therein though after all the sea exists, so it is impossible to tell the form or figure or duration

or measure of *Nirvāṇa* though after all, it is a condition that does exist. These are some of its characteristics. It is untarnished by evil dispositions. It is cool and assuages the fever arising from all evil dispositions. It does allay the thirst of the craving after lust, the craving after future life, and the craving after worldly prosperity. It is the refuge of beings tormented with the poison of evil dispositions. It does put an end to grief. It is ambrosia. It is mighty and boundless and fills not with all beings who enter into it. It is the abode of all 'good men' — the *devas*. It is all in blossom as it were with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of purity of knowledge and of emancipation. It is the support of life for it puts an end to old age and death. It does increase the power of *siddhi* or supernatural powers. It puts a stop in all beings to the suffering arising from evil disposition. It overcomes in all beings the weakness which arises from hunger and every sort of pain. It is not born neither does it grow old it does not pass away it has no rebirth it is unconquerable thieves cannot carry it, it is not attached to anything it is the sphere in which *arāhats* move nothing can obstruct it, and it is infinite. It satisfies every desire. It causes delight. It is full of lustre. It is hard to attain to. It is unequalled in the beauty of its perfume. It is praised by all the Noble ones. It is beautiful in righteousness. It has the pleasant perfume of righteousness. It has a pleasant taste. It is very exalted. It is unmovable. It is inaccessible to sinners. It is a condition in which no evil dispositions can grow. It is free from desire to please and from resentment.

*Nirvāṇa* is neither past nor future, nor present nor produced nor not-produced, nor producible.

Lastly *Nirvāṇa* is to be known by freedom from distress and danger by confidence, peace calm bliss happiness delicacy purity and freshness. He who orders his life aright, realizes that *Nirvāṇa*. He who gains the highest fruit of *Arhatship*, may be said to have seen *Nirvāṇa* face to face.

A layman also can attain *Nirvāṇa*. A close study of the *Gehatthaka-Sutta* (p. 58) and the *Jarā-Sutta* (p. 129) of the *Mahāniddesa* together with their commentaries by *Dhammapāla* helps up to look for the *āraṇas* both among the householders and the recluse. The *āraṇas* are defined as persons who have attenuated their sins and

have seen *Nirāśa* and as to householders they are represented as persons who are over-burdened with all household duties. No other discrimination is sought to be made between the *Āgamas* and the *śaṅkhayānins* than this that while the former keep to household life the latter do not. As for the attainment, both are held out as equally competent to win the highest state which is *Nirāśa*.<sup>1</sup> In the *Āgamas* *Nirāśa*, we find mention of 21 lay *arahats*.<sup>2</sup> Rhys Davids in his introduction to the *Samaññaphala Sutta* calls them laymen *arahats* (S B B., II, 63 fn.) In the *Athaśattika* (P T S. Bk. IV. p. 266), we find *Kalapaṭṭa* Yasa a householder Uṭṭara and young Brahman Setu attained arahatship in all the circumstances characterizing the life of the laity.<sup>3</sup> Referring to this point S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids have inferred that a layman under exceptional circumstances may attain arahatship but to keep it he must give up the world (*Points of Controversy*, p. 158 fn.) Rhys Davids and Mr. Rhys Davids in Part III. p. 5 of the *Dialogues of the Buddha* (S B B. Vol. IV) have raised this question 'who in the oldest period could be an arahat?' The answer is Any one — men or women, old or young, lay or religious. It is distinctly mentioned in the *Mahāpārāṇika* that, whether he is a layman or a recluse, he who attains the supreme insight to the supreme conduct of life he too will win his way to the excellent condition of arahatship.

[illegible][illegible]

<sup>2</sup> Yava kulapatto. Uthava kulapata. Seta mūlāḥ. gūḥya brahṣyama arakṣitaḥ.   
 kṛtāḥ itya vācā b. śābhye. Śrīrāma ārahaḥ.

*Gāhī pi maharāja sammā-paṭipanno āraḍḍhako hoti nāyaṃ  
dhammam kusalam pabbajito pi maharāja sammā-paṭipanno  
āraḍḍhako hoti nāyaṃ dhammam kusalam*

It is clear from this that the householder if he leads a religious life may attain to *arabhatship* which is *nirvāṇa*. The *Mahānāpaka* further points out that whosoever has attained, as a layman to *arabhatship* one of the two courses is left to him and no other — either that very day he enters the Order or he dies for beyond that day he cannot last (*For Questions of King Mahānāpaka*, II, p. 96)

All persons who as laymen, living at home and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of senses realize in themselves the condition of Peace the Supreme Good *Nirvāṇa* — all of them had in former births accomplished their training, laid the foundation in the practice of the thirteen vows had purified their walk and conduct by means of them and so now even as laymen living at home and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of senses they do realize in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good *Nirvāṇa* (*Ibid* II p. 253)

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